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STANDING FOR EVERYONE: SIERRA CLUB V. MORTON, 
SUPREME COURT DELIBERATIONS, AND A SOLUTION 
TO THE PROBLEM OF ENVIRONMENTAL STANDING 
By Scott W. Stern* 
The modern doctrine of environmental standing prevents many 
worthy environmental plaintiffs from presenting their cases in court; 
it allows those who would desecrate and despoil the environment for 
profit to do so with impunity. Considering the coming environmental 
catastrophe that climate change will almost certainly usher in, this 
restrictive doctrine has profound implications. 
But as this Article shows, the modern environmental standing 
doctrine is an aberration. For most of American history, there were no 
standing requirements even approaching the severe demands of Lujan. 
Yet the Justices who created the modern doctrine claimed they were 
simply clarifying a “traditional requirement,” or they had “always” 
interpreted standing in this manner. 
By delving deeply into the personal papers of Supreme Court 
Justices and the archives of environmental plaintiffs, this Article shows 
that the Justices’ invocation of tradition is blatantly incorrect. In so 
doing, it completely retells the story of how the less restrictive standing 
doctrine of the early twentieth century morphed into today’s 
demanding “injury-in-fact” requirement. This Article focuses 
especially on the seminal standing cases of the mid-1960s to the mid-
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1970s. By carefully reading the Justices’ opinions in concert with the 
archival material, this Article shows that the nebulous injury 
requirement of yesteryear transformed into the demanding “injury-in-
fact” requirement during this time because of the Justices’ 
inadvertence, ignorance of history, and responsiveness to 
unimaginative arguments made by plaintiffs’ lawyers. In fact, the 
Justices actually wanted to help the burgeoning environmental 
organizations that brought the seminal standing cases; but, in their 
quest to do so, the Justices accidentally created—pretty much out of 
whole cloth—the strict and punitive concept of injury-in-fact. 
This Article pays especial attention to Sierra Club v. Morton. 
Though remembered now for liberalizing the standing doctrine, this 
Article shows that the case did no such thing. Though remembered now 
for Justice Douglas’s bold dissent arguing that trees should have 
standing, this Article shows that the truly radical dissent belonged to 
Justice Blackmun. 
Finally, this Article charts a path out of this mess, by arguing for a 
thorough rethinking of the doctrine of environmental standing. 
Drawing on two forgotten yet crucial insights from Blackmun’s Sierra 
Club dissent, as well as another largely forgotten innovation of the 
1960s and 1970s, this Article argues for the passage of state-level 
environmental standing statutes, granting standing even in the 
absence of an injury. In its conclusion, this Article proposes a model 
law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Wednesday, November 17, 1971, was a clear, chilly day in 
Washington, D.C.1 A crowd of people jostled to get into Cass Gilbert’s 
majestic Supreme Court building, the line extending out the huge, 
handsome doors, down the marble steps, and onto the street below.2 
This crowd had ventured to the Supreme Court that morning to hear 
the oral arguments for a case. But this was not just any case. The crowd 
had gathered to hear two lawyers do battle in what they believed to be 
perhaps the most important environmental lawsuit of the century: 
Sierra Club v. Morton.3 Two years earlier, the Sierra Club had sued 
the federal government in an attempt to stop a beautiful glacial valley 
from being turned into a ski resort, but the arguments before the 
Justices in 1971 barely reached the merits of the case. Rather, the 
lawyers’ arguments mostly concerned standing—should the Sierra 
Club have even been able to bring this lawsuit in the first place? 
For decades, standing had been much discussed but little 
understood. Uncontroversial for most of American history,4 judges 
began restricting who had standing in the early twentieth century, and 
by the early 1970s the standing doctrine was muddled, confused, and 
strict: fewer and fewer plaintiffs had standing to sue.5 The standing 
                                                                 
 1. Today’s Weather Report, EVENING STAR (Nov. 17, 1971), C6. 
 2. M. Rupert Cutler, Sierra Club v. Hickel, at 94 (1972) (on file in Folder 12, 
Carton 6, Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund Records, University of California at 
Berkeley [hereinafter Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund Records]). 
 3. 405 U.S. 727 (1972). 
 4. See infra Part I.A. 
 5. See infra Part I.B. 
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doctrine was, as Justice John Marshall Harlan II had written a few 
years earlier, “a word game played by secret rules.”6 
Seven months after hearing oral arguments, a closely divided Court 
ruled that the Sierra Club did not have standing to sue in this case. 
However, Justice Potter Stewart pointedly informed the Club that it 
could easily fix this. The Club had based its arguments for standing on 
its well-established interest and expertise in environmental matters; if 
the Club could prove that its members had suffered a personal “injury 
in fact,” then those members could have standing to sue.7 Such an 
injury did not have to be physical or economic; it could be the result 
of harm to the Club members’ “aesthetic and recreational” values.8 So 
if Club members enjoyed hiking or camping in the valley, the 
threatened destruction of that valley would be injury enough.9 
This decision has long been celebrated as liberalizing standing, 
firmly expanding the definition of injury-in-fact to encompass non-
economic injuries and thus opening the courthouse to environmental 
plaintiffs everywhere.10 Yet Sierra Club v. Morton is probably more 
famous for the dissent written by Justice William O. Douglas. Douglas 
argued that “environmental objects” should be able “to sue for their 
own preservation.”11 Rivers, valleys, trees, beaches—all of these 
natural objects should be treated like other inanimate objects to which 
courts have given legal personhood, like ships or corporations.12 
                                                                 
 6. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 129 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 7. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734-35. 
 8. Id. at 735. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative 
Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1762 (2007); Robert V. Percival & Joanna B. Goger, 
Citizen Suits and the Future of Standing in the 21st Century: From Lujan and 
Laidlaw and Beyond: Escaping the Common Law’s Shadow: Standing in the Light 
of Laidlaw, 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 119, 119-20 (2001); Andrew C. Lillie, 
Tenth Circuit Survey: Agency Law Barriers to Successful Environmental and 
Natural Resources Litigation: Tenth Circuit Approaches to Standing and Agency 
Discretion, 78 DENV. U.L. REV. 193, 197 (2000); David R. Hodas, Standing and 
Climate Change: Can Anyone Complain About the Weather?, 15 J. LAND USE & 
ENVTL. LAW 451, 459 (2000); James L. Huffman, Symposium on the Public Trust 
and the Waters of the American West: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow: Introduction 
and Overview: A Fish Out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional 
Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 546 n.82 (1989). 
 11. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 741-42 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 12. Id. at 742-43. 
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Douglas’s powerful rhetoric immediately captured the popular 
imagination,13 but his colleague Harry Blackmun recognized at the 
time that it was not actually that radical a proposal. Practically 
speaking, according to Douglas, a river could appear in court just as 
ships or corporations did—that is, represented by “people who have a 
meaningful relation to that body of water.”14 This was not too far from 
Stewart’s majority opinion, which also found a way to allow those with 
a meaningful connection to the valley (i.e. the Sierra Club) to sue for 
its protection. This led Blackmun and his clerks to conclude, 
“Douglas’s analysis is just an imaginative and novel method of 
arriving at Stewart’s result.”15 
Rather, the more radical dissent belonged to Blackmun. “If this were 
an ordinary case, I would join the opinion and the Court’s judgment 
and be quite content,” he wrote.16 
But this is not ordinary, run-of-the-mill litigation. The case 
poses—if only we choose to acknowledge and reach them—
significant aspects of a wide, growing, and disturbing 
problem, that is, the Nation’s and the world’s deteriorating 
environment with its resulting ecological disturbances. Must 
our law be so rigid and our procedural concepts so inflexible 
that we render ourselves helpless when the existing methods 
and the traditional concepts do not quite fit and do not prove 
to be entirely adequate for new issues?17 
Blackmun proposed two alternatives to Stewart’s ruling. First, the 
Court could find for the Sierra Club “on condition that the Sierra Club 
forthwith amend its complaint to meet the specifications the Court 
prescribes for standing.”18 Second, Blackmun would “permit an 
imaginative expansion of our traditional concepts of standing in order 
to enable an organization such as the Sierra Club, possessed, as it is, 
                                                                 
 13. See infra notes 306-07 and accompanying text. 
 14. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 743 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
 15. George T. Frampton, Jr., Re: Sierra Club No. 70-34, at 6 (Mar. 30, 1972) (on 
file in Folder 7, Box 137, Harry Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress [hereinafter 
Blackmun Papers]). 
 16. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 755 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 17. Id. at 755–56. 
 18. Id. at 756–57. 
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of pertinent, bona fide, and well-recognized attributes and purposes in 
the area of environment, to litigate environmental issues.”19 This 
second option apparently would have allowed individuals or groups 
with a deep interest in the environment to have standing to bring 
environmental cases even in the absence of an injury-in-fact. 
In the decades following Sierra Club v. Morton, the Supreme Court 
sharply restricted standing for environmental plaintiffs. In 1992, 
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote for the Court in Lujan v. Defenders of 
Wildlife,20 articulating a new test, which, while still allowing for 
aesthetic or recreational injuries, made attaining standing considerably 
harder: a plaintiff must demonstrate that she has suffered (1) a 
concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent “injury in fact,” which 
is (2) “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct, and (3) which can 
be redressed by a favorable court decision.21 In Lujan, the Court also 
ruled, for the first time ever,22 that an explicit congressional grant of 
standing to “citizens” to sue for a violation of an environmental statute 
was unconstitutional.23 It is apparent that Scalia’s opinion was 
motivated, in part, by his “undisguised hostility toward the purposes 
of the environmental laws.”24 Justice Blackmun, in the twilight of his 
career, accused Scalia of going on a “slash-and-burn expedition 
through the law of environmental standing.”25 
Today, environmental standing remains incredibly restrictive. This 
is a shame, for it prevents many worthy environmental plaintiffs from 
even presenting their cases in a court of law; it allows those who would 
desecrate and despoil the environment for profit to do so with 
impunity.26 Considering the coming environmental catastrophe that 
climate change will almost certainly usher in, this is a shame indeed. 
                                                                 
 19. Id. at 757. 
 20. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
 21. Id. at 560–61. 
 22. Cass R. Sunstein, What’s Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, “Injuries,” 
and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 165 (1992). 
 23. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–79. 
 24. Percival & Goger, supra note 10, at 120; see also Antonin Scalia, The 
Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 
SUFFOLK UNIV. L. REV. 881, 896–97 (1983). 
 25. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 26. See Holly Doremus, The Persistent Problem of Standing in Environmental 
Law, 40 ENVTL. L. REV. 10956 (2010). 
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Yet how to fix environmental standing? How to free ourselves from 
such a complicated, convoluted, conservative doctrine? 
In this Article, I will advocate for the elimination of the injury-in-
fact requirement, at least in environmental cases. To do so, I will 
thoroughly retrace the history of standing in general, and of 
environmental standing in particular. In Part I, I will show that Scalia’s 
interpretation of standing is a stark departure from the way that courts 
interpreted standing for most of American history—and a bald-faced 
misrepresentation of history. From before the Founding until well into 
the twentieth century, parties needed only a cause of action to appear 
in court; there was no requirement that they demonstrate anything 
approaching the modern definition of standing. The Framers certainly 
never intended Article III to limit standing. Furthermore, individuals 
could always sue on behalf of the public, so long as they had a statutory 
or common law cause of action, or so long as they were attempting to 
compel the performance of a governmental obligation. This concept of 
“standing for the public” had deep roots in British common law, and it 
was explicitly affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1875.27 Only in the 
early twentieth century did the Court begin demanding that plaintiffs 
show that they had suffered an injury, and even into the mid-twentieth 
century, the Court still accepted plaintiffs’ ability to stand for the 
public. 
Though many scholars have studied this earlier period,28 I will pay 
especial attention to the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. 
By closely scrutinizing the Justices’ personal papers, I will show that 
the nebulous injury requirement of the early twentieth century 
morphed into the demanding “injury-in-fact” requirement during this 
time because of the Justices’ inadvertence, ignorance of history, and in 
response to unimaginative arguments made by plaintiffs’ lawyers. 
Further, even in the standing cases of the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
it is clear from their papers that the Justices still intended to allow 
uninjured parties to be able to stand for the public, so long as these 
parties were enabled to do so by statutory causes of action. Yet the 
Justices repeatedly (and apparently unintentionally) failed to make this 
                                                                 
 27. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 354–55 (1875). 
 28. See Sunstein, supra note 22; Raoul Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: 
Is It a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Louis L. Jaffe, 
Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265 (1961). 
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clear, which enabled Scalia to rewrite the history of standing in the 
1990s, claiming he was simply clarifying a “traditional requirement.”29 
In subsequent decisions, the Court claimed it had “always” treated 
standing in this way,30 which one scholar has commented “is bad 
history or a blatant lie.”31 
This history matters, because our collective ignorance of it is what 
allows the revisionists to so effectively neuter standing and claim they 
are acting conservatively—cautiously, in line with recent precedent—
when they are, in fact, acting radically. Further, the history of 
environmental standing in the 1960s and 1970s reveals the profound 
danger of this historical amnesia. By charting exactly how the Justices 
of this period stumbled toward Lujan, I reveal how subtle is the 
damage wrought by sloppiness and uninspired arguments, and how the 
modern doctrine is distinctly contrary to prior Justices’ intentions. The 
Justices actually wanted to help the burgeoning environmental 
organizations that brought the seminal standing cases; but, in their 
quest to liberalize the doctrine, the Justices accidentally created—
pretty much out of whole cloth—the strict and punitive concept of 
injury-in-fact. 
This Article is the first to retell the complete history of the Supreme 
Court’s internal deliberations over the seminal standing cases of the 
mid-1960s and early 1970s. Though several scholars have devoted a 
page or two to examining individuals Justices’ papers with regard to 
these cases—Robert V. Percival with Justices Marshall32 and 
Blackmun,33 Peter Manus with Justice Douglas34—none have delved 
deeply into this specific line of cases, or assembled the stories told by 
all of these archival documents in a single narrative, or, indeed, 
focused especially on standing. Doing so allows us to fully grasp how 
muddled and unintentional the transition toward “injury in fact” and 
                                                                 
 29. Scalia, supra note 24, at 881–82. 
 30. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819 (1997). 
 31. Jeremy Patrick, A Polemic Against the Standing Requirement in 
Constitutional Cases, 41 CAP. U. L. REV., 603, 622 (2013). 
 32. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights 
From the Marshall Papers, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10606 (1993). 
 33. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Supreme Court: Highlights 
from the Blackmun Papers, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10637 (2005). 
 34. Peter Manus, Wild Bill Douglas’s Last Stand: A Retrospective on the First 
Supreme Court Environmentalist, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 111, 155–168 (1999). 
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away from “standing for the public” truly was. It also allows us to 
understand how closely linked the history of the modern standing 
doctrine is with the history of the modern environmental movement. 
Using this history, I will argue that we must return to the older 
concept of allowing plaintiffs to stand for the public, at least in 
environmental cases. In so doing, I draw on two critical—though 
widely forgotten—insights from Blackmun’s Sierra Club dissent and 
other writings: first, that plaintiffs should be able to stand in 
environmental cases in the absence of an injury-in-fact, and second, 
that they should be able to do this because environmental cases are 
simply different. They are more urgent and more extreme than other 
cases. Though Blackmun himself was apparently unaware of the old 
doctrine of standing for the public, and though he inaccurately 
characterized the twentieth century standing doctrine as 
“traditional,”35 he nonetheless realized something that has escaped 
modern judges and scholars: that restrictive notions of standing have 
no place in environmental cases. 
In Part II, I will attempt to chart a path forward. To fix the problem 
of environmental standing, we must create a statutory grant of standing 
and cause of action for anyone acting to protect the environment. As I 
will argue, this is justified by the profound ahistoricism of the current 
environmental standing doctrine and by the extreme urgency of threats 
to the environment. Yet given the current makeup of the Supreme 
Court, it is highly unlikely the Justices would be willing to overturn 
Lujan directly. Therefore, the best strategy for moving forward is to 
pursue this goal at the state level: to seek either state laws or, ideally, 
amendments to state constitutions. As I shall demonstrate in the 
following, over the past several decades, a number of states liberalized 
environmental standing (at the same time that the Court was destroying 
the concept of standing for the public), often with encouraging results. 
Yet a close look at these state environmental standing statutes reveals 
that those drafting such statutes must be exceptionally careful with 
their phrasing. Courts have repeatedly found ways to poke holes in 
these statutes because of sloppy or ambiguous wording. 
                                                                 
 35. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 755–56 (1972) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 
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Therefore, in this Article’s conclusion, I will propose a model 
statute. This is, however, just a draft, and I sincerely hope that other 
advocates revise it to make it as Scalia-proof, so to speak, as possible. 
I: STANDING IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES YESTERDAY: THE 
MISUNDERSTOOD HISTORY OF SIERRA CLUB V. MORTON 
A. The Founding to the 1960s 
Historically speaking, there was no requirement that litigants 
demonstrate standing. As many scholars have noted, the Framers of 
the Constitution said nothing to indicate that they wished to limit 
standing.36 In fact, the only oblique reference to standing at the 
Constitutional Convention was James Madison declaring that matters 
overseen by judges should “be limited to cases of a Judiciary 
Nature.”37 If, indeed, the Framers intended to follow the English 
model, they would have gazed across the pond to see a complete 
absence of the standing requirement.38 Of course, this didn’t mean that 
anyone could bring a lawsuit about anything, or on behalf of anyone 
else. Article III of the Constitution extends the “Judicial Power” to 
“Cases” (that is, civil and criminal disputes) and “Controversies” (that 
is, civil disputes).39 The so-called “cases and controversies” 
requirement obviously demands a cause of action. For one individual 
suing another, there had to be a reason and there had to be a remedy. 
The legislature or the common law had to confer a right to sue in order 
for a case or controversy to exist.40 
What about an individual suing the state to remedy a harm greater 
than the one he himself suffered, or to force the state to perform (or 
stop performing) a particular act, even if that act didn’t affect him, per 
                                                                 
 36. See, e.g., George Van Cleve, Congressional Power to Confer Broad Citizen 
Standing in Environmental Cases, 29 ENVTL. L. REV. 10028, 10034–35 (1999); 
Sunstein, supra note 22, at 173; Berger, supra note 28, at 818; Patrick, supra note 
31, at 621; see also Percival & Goger, supra note 10, at 121. 
 37. Susan Bandes, The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN L. REV. 227, 231 (1990) (quoting 
2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 430 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)). 
 38. Van Cleve, supra note 36, at 10029–34; Berger, supra note 28, at 819–20; 
Jaffe, supra note 28, at 1270. 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. On the original meaning of “cases” and 
“controversies,” see Sunstein, supra note 22, at 168. 
 40. Sunstein, supra note 22, at 170–71. 
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se? The English had a well-established common law practice of 
allowing “strangers” to bring suit to challenge virtually any public 
action.41 And in the first century-and-a-half after the Constitutional 
Convention, American courts followed these precedents and rejected 
calls to limit them. In 1794, the New Jersey Supreme Court made this 
explicit when several electors questioned the vote-counting method 
prescribed in an election statute. The state argued that the court was 
without jurisdiction to hear the case, and that the legislature was the 
proper place to remedy such a statute. The court replied that it had 
general powers “to interfere in all cases, where either an individual, or 
a collection of persons have sustained any injury.”42 As the nineteenth 
century progressed, courts differed over whether citizens seeking to 
vindicate a public right could do so through actions to secure either 
injunctions or writs of mandamus, or both, or neither.43 Yet, by and 
large, actions brought by private individuals “to vindicate the public 
interest in the enforcement of public obligations” were a hallmark of 
the American judicial system.44 No individual had to establish his 
“standing” to bring such an action. The same was true, in many cases, 
for individuals “standing for the public” to sue a private party.45 
In 1875, the Supreme Court affirmed this broad right to bring actions 
on behalf of the public. A group of merchants who made use of the 
Union Pacific Railroad to transport their goods sought a writ of 
mandamus to compel Union Pacific to use a particular bridge linking 
Nebraska to Iowa (on the grounds of railroads’ statutory responsibility 
to operate “as one connected, continuous line”).46 The railroad did not 
deny that this was its statutory duty, but challenged the merchants’ 
ability to secure a “writ to enforce the performance of a public duty, 
unless the non-performance of it works to them a special injury.”47 
                                                                 
 41. See Berger, supra note 28, at 818–19, 824–25, 827; Jaffe, supra note 28, at 
1274–75; R.J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1764 
(1999); Jacob Reitz, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 
SUPP. 437, 441 (2002). 
 42. State v. Justices of Middlesex, 1 N.J.L. 244, 247 (1794), cited in Jaffe, supra 
note 28, at 1275–76). 
 43. Jaffe, supra note 28, at 1275–78. 
 44. Id. at 1276–79. 
 45. See Elizabeth Magill, Standing for the Public: A Lost History, 95 VA. L. REV. 
1131, 1134 (2009); Sunstein, supra note 22, at 175–78, 182. 
 46. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Hall, 91 U.S. 343, 343 (1875). 
 47. Id. at 355. 
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Relying on English precedent, the Court responded that they could. 
Though the merchants “had no interest other than such as belonged to 
others engaged in employment like theirs, and [though] the duty they 
seek to enforce by the writ is a duty to the public generally,” they could 
bring such a suit.48 
It wasn’t until several decades into the twentieth century—with the 
concomitant emergence of the modern administrative state; the 
statutory re-establishment of federal question jurisdiction, which 
flooded federal courts with cases; and the rise of a private rights model 
of liberalism wherein activists increasingly turned to courts—that 
those courts began demanding citizens bringing public actions have 
“standing” to sue.49 The typical birthdate assigned to “standing” is 
1923. That year, according to most narratives, the Supreme Court for 
the first time barred a citizen from bringing a suit not on the grounds 
that she lacked a cause of action, but rather because that she lacked 
standing to sue.50 In Frothingham v. Mellon, the plaintiff—a taxpayer 
challenging the constitutionality of the Maternity Act of 1921 and 
seeking to enjoin federal expenditures under that Act—failed to 
demonstrate that she had “sustained . . . some direct injury . . . and not 
merely that [s]he suffers in some indefinite way in common with 
people generally.”51 Steven Winter identifies the birthdate as one year 
earlier; in 1922, in Fairchild v. Hughes, Justice Brandeis wrote an 
opinion that rejected a taxpayer suit because the “[p]laintiff’s alleged 
interest in the question submitted is not such as to afford a basis for 
                                                                 
 48. Id. at 354–55. 
 49. Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-
Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1452–55 (1987). 
 50. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 91 (1968); Winter, supra note 49, at 1376 & 
n.21 (“Typically, contemporary casebooks on the law of federal courts and on 
constitutional law discuss Frothingham but fail altogether to note its predecessor, 
Fairchild v. Hughes . . .”); Francisco Benzoni, Environmental Standing: Who 
Determines the Value of Other Life?, 18 DUKE ENVTL L. F. 347, 351 (2008).; Pierce, 
supra note 41, at 1765; Berger, supra note 28, at 819. 
Note, however, that earlier cases had alluded to the requirement that citizens bringing 
public actions have some “interest” in the action. See, e.g., Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 
24, 31 (1907) (“For the courts to interfere and at the instance of a citizen, who does 
not disclose the amount of his interest, stay the work of construction by stopping the 
payment of money from the Treasury of the United States therefor, would be an 
exercise of judicial power which, to say the least, is novel and extraordinary.”) 
 51. Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923). 
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this proceeding.”52 Elizabeth Magill identifies the birthdate as 1923 
but points to a different case: Edward Hines Yellow Pine Trustees v. 
United States, in which Justice Brandeis again rejected a lawsuit filed 
against an administrative agency because the plaintiffs had not 
suffered any “legal injury, actual or threatened.”53 
Notably, none of these cases used the word “standing” and none 
cited any precedent supporting their conclusions.54 Yet over the next 
several decades, the Court built upon these cases to develop the 
foundations of the modern standing doctrine. “The crucial cases 
involved efforts by citizens at large to invoke the Constitution to 
invalidate democratic outcomes,” wrote Cass Sunstein.55 “In such 
cases, the Court held that there was no personal stake for the invocation 
of judicial power.”56 As Sunstein and Magill note, in each of these 
proto-standing cases from the early part of the century, no common 
law right was at stake, and neither a statute nor a constitutional 
provision had created a private right of action.57 Likewise, in none of 
the opinions did the Court state that standing was required by Article 
III.58 Rather, in all of these opinions the Court denied standing when 
plaintiffs (or their “interests”) were not injured (or threatened with 
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v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341–45 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Myers v. 
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injury). Such was apparently the requirement—in the absence of a 
statutory or common law right of action. 
Liberal justices like Brandeis and Frankfurter created this basic 
“standing” doctrine in part to “preclude any dissatisfied private citizen 
from invoking the Constitution in the courts to challenge the 
progressive programs enacted by the polity.”59 The Court as a whole 
also used the standing doctrine to safeguard itself. In a per curiam 
decision from 1937, the justices denied a motion filed by a private 
attorney seeking to challenge Hugo Black’s appointment to the Court. 
“The motion papers disclose no interest upon the part of the petitioner 
other than that of a citizen and a member of the bar of this Court,” 
wrote the Justices.60  
“That is insufficient. It is an established principle that to 
entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to 
determine the validity of executive or legislative action he 
must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger 
of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action and it 
is not sufficient that he has merely a general interest 
common to all members of the public.”61  
This principle was, in fact, only recently and only partially 
“established,” but by the late 1930s the Justices had precedent on 
which to rely. 
The first case to specifically state that “standing” was a requirement 
and limitation under Article III was decided in 1944 (and the Court 
didn’t state this again until 1952).62 What exactly Article III required, 
however, was still unclear. In 1952, Justice Frankfurter, for one, 
apparently believed that the Article had two (admittedly vague) 
requirements for standing: (1) the plaintiff’s interest in the matter must 
be of “material significance,” and (2) the plaintiff’s interest must be 
                                                                 
 59. Winter, supra note 49, at 1457; see also Sunstein, supra note 22, at 179. 
 60. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam). 
 61. Id. at 633–34. 
 62. See Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310–11 (1944); Adler v. Board of 
Education, 342 U.S. 485, 501 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“jurisdiction o[f] 
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“differentiated from the mass of his fellow citizens.”63 These “material 
significance” and differentiation requirements were not as rigorous as 
the modern “injury-in-fact” requirement. (The latter term was not even 
coined until 1958.)64 Most notably, they did not necessarily demand an 
injury (nor did they specify that such an injury be imminent).65 
“Though now elevated to constitutional requirements,” wrote 
Francisco Benzoni, “this position is consistent with the claim that 
standing is conferred so long as the law—either common law or 
statute—has conferred upon the plaintiff a cause of action, giving her 
the required interest.”66 
This view, reflecting the previous quarter-century of judge-made 
standing law, was codified in 1946 in the Administrative Procedure 
Act (APA).67 Section 10 of the APA specifically enabled a person 
“suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected 
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute” 
to seek redress in the courts.68 As Cass Sunstein noted, the “adversely 
affected or aggrieved” language was in fact “congressional 
authorization of actions by people lacking legal injuries.”69 Section 10 
intentionally codified the citizen standing regime that had existed prior 
to the APA’s passage—which held, in short, that citizens had standing 
to challenge agency action within the meaning of the statute governing 
the relevant agency. Some statutes allowed “any person” to challenge 
agency action, while others were more restrictive. The APA 
maintained them all, while requiring nothing resembling an injury.70 
Indeed, in a 1940 case called FCC v. Sanders Bros., the Court had 
already specifically approved language identical to that in Section 10 
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(contained in the Federal Communications Act).71 As Elizabeth Magill 
observed, Sanders Bros. also allowed public actions based on that 
language; “courts and commentators read Sander Bros. to allow those 
without legal rights to sue on behalf of the public.”72 Thus, as the 
country—and the Court—entered the 1960s, individuals suffering a 
“legal wrong” had standing to sue the government; so too could those 
who suffered no legal wrong but were simply empowered by a 
statutory right of action to bring suit on behalf of the public. There was 
no requirement even approaching a strict “injury in fact.”73 
B. The Swingin’ Sixties 
The pivotal decade in the emergence of the modern standing 
doctrine was the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. This was also the pivotal 
decade in the emergence of the modern environmental movement. This 
was no coincidence. The birth of modern environmentalism and the 
so-called Big Green environmental organizations was in large part 
spurred by highly public battles over standing; and several of the most 
important standing cases from this period were environmental cases. 
This shared history attests to the centrality of environmental litigation 
in the shaping of the modern standing doctrine. The Justices’ papers, 
as well as other sources, make clear that they intended to liberalize 
injury-in-fact in large part to assist these environmental organizations. 
However, in so doing, they inadvertently concretized the demand for 
injury-in-fact, killing off the doctrine of standing for the public in the 
process. 
1. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power 
Commission 
In the conventional narrative of modern American environmental 
history, the starting point is often placed at 1962, with the publication 
of Rachel Carson’s epic anti-pesticide manifesto, Silent Spring.74 The 
book called for a government agency independent from the 
Department of Agriculture to regulate pesticides and other toxic 
                                                                 
 71. 309 U.S. 470, 476–77 (1940). 
 72. Magill, supra note 45, at 1141. 
 73. See Sunstein, supra note 22, at 181–82; Magill, supra note 45, at 1150. 
 74. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962). On its impact, see PATRICIA H. 
HYNES, THE RECURRING SILENT SPRING 3–9 (1989). 
2018] STANDING FOR EVERYONE 37 
 
chemicals; this demand led directly to the 1970 establishment of the 
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”).75 Yet at the same time, a 
grassroots uprising in upstate New York led to the first significant 
court decision on standing in environmental cases; according to one 
writer, this uprising also “inaugurated the birth of the modern 
environmental movement.”76 The residents of Hudson Valley had been 
fighting to protect and preserve Storm King Mountain for decades.77 
When, in 1962, Consolidated Edison (“ConEd”)—New York City’s 
utility company—announced that it was going to build a pumped-
storage hydroelectric plant near the mountain—and, in the process, 
create a lake and chop off the top of the mountain—several residents 
formed the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference to save Storm 
King.78 Though Scenic Hudson struggled initially, by 1964 the group 
was benefiting from what historian Robert Lifset calls the “zeitgeist” 
of the mid-1960s.79 The Sierra Club’s campaign a year earlier, to stop 
the federal government from flooding part of the Grand Canyon, had 
generated public sympathy for conservation, and Scenic Hudson 
capitalized on that energy.80 
In 1965, an ascendant Scenic Hudson challenged the decision of the 
Federal Power Commission (FPC) to issue a license to ConEd, on the 
grounds that the FPC had not adequately considered the environmental 
impact of ConEd’s activity. When the FPC predictably ruled against 
Scenic Hudson, the group appealed to the Second Circuit.81 In their 
brief to the Second Circuit, ConEd and the FPC argued that Scenic 
Hudson lacked standing: “no one has ‘standing to sue’ if the only 
injury of which he complains is injury common to the public at 
                                                                 
 75. See HYNES, supra note 74, at 46–48, 148–63. 
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large.”82 This assertion was contrary to Supreme Court precedent83 and 
centuries of common law,84 yet Scenic Hudson’s attorneys felt they 
were almost certain to lose; their only chance was “that some of the 
judges would be familiar with the beauty of Storm King Mountain.”85 
Remarkably, Scenic Hudson won. Perhaps its attorneys were 
correct, for the Second Circuit decision opened by invoking Storm 
King’s “unique beauty and major historical significance” and noting 
that it was home to “one of the finest pieces of river scenery in the 
world.”86 The opinion then moved to the issue of standing, dwelling 
on language in the Federal Power Act similar to that in the APA, 
granting judicial review to any party “aggrieved” by an order of the 
FPC.87 “The ‘case’ or ‘controversy’ requirement of Article III, § 2 of 
the Constitution does not require that an ‘aggrieved’ or ‘adversely 
affected’ party have a personal economic interest,” wrote the court, 
rejecting one of ConEd/FPC’s contentions.88 
The Federal Power Act seeks to protect non-economic as 
well as economic interests . . . . In order to insure that the 
Federal Power Commission will adequately protect the 
public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and 
recreational aspects of power development, those who by 
their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest 
in such areas, must be held to be included in the class of 
‘aggrieved’ parties under § 313(b). We hold that the Federal 
Power Act gives petitioners a legal right to protect their 
special interests.89 
                                                                 
 82. Motion to Dismiss and Brief for Respondent, Scenic Hudson Pres. 
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This decision would later be hailed as expanding standing for those 
seeking to protect the environment.90 It did no such thing. In fact, as 
Elizabeth Magill has noted, Scenic Hudson created a precedent that 
justified contracting standing for those seeking to represent the 
public.91 Whereas centuries of precedent had allowed those with a 
statutory right of action but no personal injury to bring suit on behalf 
of the public, the Second Circuit allowed those with a statutory right 
of action to bring suit only because they had suffered a personal 
injury—harm to their “special interest.”92 This injured interest could 
be “aesthetic, conservational, and recreational,” but still—there must 
be an interest and an injury. No longer was an uninjured party standing 
for the public enough. Thus, the victory for Hudson Valley 
environmentalists would one day be a defeat for the environmental 
movement as a whole. 
Magill asks why the Second Circuit ruled this way. She writes, 
“There is no evidence, it should be said, that [the Second Circuit] 
intended to narrow standing law—indeed, just the opposite seems 
true.”93 Magill concludes that the Second Circuit’s motivation is 
“unclear.”94 Lifset’s analysis provides one compelling answer. The 
Second Circuit’s prosaic opening language indicates that the judges 
were apparently motivated in part by a desire to find a rationale to 
allow Scenic Hudson to protect the environment.95 A place of such 
“unique beauty and major historical significance” must be defended. 
Yet the eloquence of the judges’ paean to conservation obscured the 
sloppiness of their standing analysis. 
The battle over Storm King continued to rage until late 1980, when 
ConEd finally agreed to drop the plan for its hydroelectric plant in the 
Hudson Valley. Yet the battle had lasting effects on the environmental 
movement as a whole. It generated headlines and attention. It 
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popularized a fairly new tactic for environmentalists: impact 
litigation.96 It generated important new organizations. In 1970, for 
instance, Scenic Hudson lawyers and activists founded a public 
interest litigation firm focused on the environment: the Natural 
Resources Defense Council (NRDC).97 Finally, it influenced a series 
of cases in the late 1960s and early 1970s in which courts recognized 
that non-economic, or aesthetic, injuries were sufficient to support 
standing.98 
2. Flast v. Cohen 
The Supreme Court denied certiorari to ConEd and the FPC in 
Scenic Hudson,99 yet courts immediately began citing the Second 
Circuit’s decision.100 In United Church of Christ v. FCC, decided just 
one year later, the D.C. Circuit held that two Mississippi civil rights 
activists had standing to challenge the FCC’s broadcast license 
renewal for a radio station that broadcast racist reports because they 
had “a genuine and legitimate interest”—as actual listeners of that 
radio station—which was being injured by the racist reports.101 The 
year after that, in 1967, the Southern District of New York held that 
residents of Bedford, New York, had standing to challenge the state’s 
siting of an interstate along a route that would harm their local 
environment. The residents had a statutory right of action through the 
Administrative Procedure Act, and their “conservation interests” were 
being injured by New York’s decision.102 Both of these decisions cited 
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Scenic Hudson and affirmed its holding—that a party had to have 
suffered an injury to have standing; even when the party had a statutory 
right of action, they could not stand for the public, but only to vindicate 
their own injured interest. 
The next year, this trend reached the Supreme Court. In 1968, the 
Court decided a case involving several federal income taxpayers who 
challenged the appropriation of federal funds for religious schools to 
purchase textbooks and other materials; they claimed this violated the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.103 The government 
claimed that the taxpayers didn’t have standing to sue, but the Court 
disagreed. Rather, Chief Justice Warren, writing for an eight-justice 
majority, used the case, Flast v. Cohen,104 to somewhat qualify 
Frothingham v. Mellon, the seminal 1923 case that held that a taxpayer 
who failed to demonstrate that she had “sustained . . . some direct 
injury” could not claim standing “merely [because s]he suffers in some 
indefinite way in common with people generally.”105 For 45 years, 
Warren wrote, Frothingham had stood “as an impenetrable barrier to 
suits against Acts of Congress brought by individuals who can assert 
only the interest of federal taxpayers.”106 Yet no longer. Since the 
Establishment Clause “does specifically limit [Congress’s] taxing and 
spending power . . . a taxpayer will have a clear stake as a taxpayer in 
assuring [this limitation is] not breached by Congress [because] his tax 
money is being extracted and spent in violation of specific 
constitutional protections against such abuses of legislative power.”107 
Such a holding was consistent with Frothingham, Warren wrote, 
because in that case Mrs. Frothingham brought suit under the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause,108 which “does not protect 
taxpayers against increases in liability,” while the Establishment 
Clause “operates as a specific constitutional limitation upon the 
exercise by Congress of the taxing and spending power.”109 
Thus, Flast was a partial embrace of Scenic Hudson by the Supreme 
Court. In both cases, the plaintiffs had a right of action (an implicit 
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constitutional right of action in the former, and an explicit statutory 
right of action in the latter); in both cases, the plaintiffs were standing 
not for the public but rather to vindicate an injury they had suffered 
(the misuse of their tax money in the former, and the destruction of an 
area in which they were especially interested in the latter). The 
difference was that the injury in Flast was economic in nature, while 
Scenic Hudson had explicitly granted standing because of “aesthetic, 
conservational, and recreational” injuries. Whether a plaintiff 
suffering only the latter kind of injury would have standing was still 
up for debate. 
Some quickly heralded Flast as “greatly contribut[ing] to the 
liberalization of the law of standing.”110 Yet in a prescient dissent, 
Justice Harlan recognized that this was not entirely the case. “This 
Court has previously held that individual litigants have standing to 
represent the public interest, despite their lack of economic or other 
personal interests, if Congress has appropriately authorized such 
suits,” Harlan wrote.111 “I would adhere to that principle.”112 The 
majority, Harland recognized, had liberalized standing for someone 
who had only suffered a tiny economic injury, yet it demanded there 
be an injury; an uninjured plaintiff could no longer stand for the public. 
The majority had not explicitly addressed standing for the public. 
Justice Douglas concurred in Flast, in a compelling and confusing 
opinion. He boldly wrote that it would be wise “to be rid of 
Frothingham here and now.”113 “The States have experimented with 
taxpayers’ suits and with only two exceptions now allow them,” he 
continued.114 
A few state decisions are frankly based on the theory that a 
taxpayer is a private attorney general seeking to vindicate 
the public interest. Some of them require that the taxpayer 
have more than an infinitesimal financial stake in the 
problem. At the federal level, Congress can of course define 
broad categories of ‘aggrieved’ persons who have standing 
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to litigate cases or controversies . . . . Taxpayers can be 
vigilant private attorneys general. Their stake in the outcome 
of litigation may be de minimis by financial standards, yet 
very great when measured by a particular constitutional 
mandate . . . . I would be as liberal in allowing taxpayers 
standing to object to these violations of the First Amendment 
as I would in granting standing to people to complain of any 
invasion of their rights under the Fourth Amendment or the 
Fourteenth or under any other guarantee in the Constitution 
itself or in the Bill of Rights.115 
This concurrence is hard to parse because Justice Douglas did not 
clarify whether the “rights” on which he would grant standing were 
purely economic or not. He consistently referred to “taxpayers” and 
“taxpayers’ suits” throughout his opinion, suggesting that perhaps the 
injury had to be economic; but he concluded that he would grant 
standing to anyone suffering an invasion of rights under any provision 
of the Constitution or Bill of Rights, where injuries are often non-
economic. Nonetheless, however, his opinion seemed to suggest that 
there had to be some injury. Notably, he did not join in Justice Harlan’s 
dissent. 
It appears from his surviving papers that Douglas already saw 
himself as something of an iconoclast on the issue of standing. He had 
originally planned not to concur but to dissent.116 He had gone against 
the advice of his clerks, who felt that Frothingham was “sound and 
should be affirmed.”117 Douglas apparently believed that President 
Kennedy agreed with his take.118 And his opinion inspired some strong 
reactions. Justice Byron White, upon receiving a copy of Douglas’s 
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concurrence in Flast, scrawled across the top, “Substantive due 
process—Boo! Judicial Activism Hurrah!”119 
Douglas’s distinctive take on standing would be integral to 
reshaping the doctrine in the years to come—in a way that, 
counterintuitively and tragically, would ultimately do a great deal to 
damage the environmental movement he so cherished. 
3. Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. 
Camp and Barlow v. Collins 
Late in 1969, two cases reached the Court that allowed the Justices 
to elaborate on the doctrine of standing. And though these cases were, 
like Flast, heralded for liberalizing the doctrine120 and paving the road 
to Sierra Club, they also paved the road to Lujan and beyond. An 
examination of the justices’ personal papers reveals that the true 
originator of the pivotal “injury in fact” language was more 
complicated than any scholar has previously asserted. Further, it is 
apparent that the Justices were at most only vaguely aware of how 
sharp their break from pre-twentieth century standing doctrine was, or 
that they were inadvertently killing off the old concept of standing for 
the public. Finally, there is a tantalizing hint that at least some of the 
Justices’ votes were motivated in part by a concern for protecting the 
interests of environmentalists. 
The more important of the two cases, and the first to be argued, was 
Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. 
Camp.121 In that case, several data processing service providers 
objected to a rule promulgated by the Comptroller of the Currency that 
allowed banks to begin offering competing data processing services. 
Claiming that this rule violated the Bank Service Corporation Act 
(which banned banks from doing anything other than banking), the 
data processing merchants sued. To the district court in Minnesota and 
the Eighth Circuit, Data Processing was open-and-shut. “There is a 
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long and well established line of judicial authority holding that 
plaintiffs whose only injury is loss due to competition lack standing to 
maintain legal action to redress their economic injury,” wrote the 
district court, citing three Supreme Court cases and six lower court 
cases.122 The Eighth Circuit agreed, but added a significant passage: 
“Unless a relevant statute provides for a ‘party in interest’ to seek 
judicial review or unless a complainant possesses a recognized legal 
interest, he lacks standing to be a ‘private attorney general’ to represent 
the public interest.”123 This articulated the older, pre-Scenic Hudson 
doctrine, opening the door for the Supreme Court to return there if it 
wished. 
In the second case, Barlow v. Collins,124 a group of tenant farmers 
from Alabama (who relied on cash advances and other payments from 
the federal government for their cotton crop) asserted standing to 
challenge the Secretary of Agriculture’s decision to amend a regulation 
in a way that they argued would compel them to finance much of their 
work by borrowing from their landlords, who charged very high rates 
of interest. The lower courts again ruled that the farmers did not have 
standing; as the Fifth Circuit wrote, “in the absence of an express or 
implied statutory grant of standing, mere economic harm to an 
appellant made possible by government action (even if allegedly 
illegal) does not give standing to sue to restrain such action.”125 This 
phrasing likewise seemed to leave the Supreme Court the option of 
reviving the old doctrine of standing “for the public.” 
The Court heard oral arguments for Data Processing on November 
18, 1969, and for Barlow the next day. The Association of Data 
Processing Service Organizations’ attorney praised Flast and asked the 
court to “overrule” Frothingham.126 Barlow’s attorney argued that 
Barlow had a statutory right of action and had suffered an economic 
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injury; thus, this case was just like Flast and other recent precedents.127 
Neither attorney challenged the notion that their client had to suffer 
some sort of injury in order to have standing. 
At conference on November 24, the justices discussed both cases. 
Only eight justices sat around the table—Chief Justice Warren and 
Associate Justice Abe Fortas had both recently resigned—the first 
because of advanced age, the second because of scandal—and the just-
elected President Nixon had only had time to replace one of them so 
far. With regard to Data Processing, the newly appointed Chief Justice 
Warren Burger said he leaned toward voting to reverse, and every 
other justice declared himself definitely on the side of reverse, except 
Potter Stewart, who said he would affirm.128 The same was true for 
Barlow, except that Burger was squarely in the reverse camp.129 
Burger assigned Douglas to write the opinion for Data Processing and 
Brennan to write the opinion for Barlow. 
In his first draft, Douglas wrote, “We have no doubt in the present 
case that there is an actual controversy in which petitioners have a 
direct interest and that it is affected by the challenged regulation.”130 
This was a proper basis for standing, because the petitioners’ interests 
were under the “penumbra” of the APA.131 A little later in the opinion, 
he had language about cases that “involve the public interest,” in which 
a “private attorney general [can] tender the questions on the merits.”132 
Douglas added that someone who is “likely to be financially injured” 
may be “the best” private attorney general,133 but nonetheless this 
passage at least left open the possibility that an uninjured party could 
stand for the public. His first draft made no reference to Scenic 
Hudson. Neither his initial draft, nor his second draft, contained either 
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of the phrases for which Data Processing would later be famous: “zone 
of interests” and “injury in fact.” 
Many scholars would later take the “injury in fact” requirement, and 
Douglas’s creation of it, to task for being “remarkably sloppy,”134 for 
being an “unredeemed disaster,”135 and for doing “[m]ore damage to 
the intellectual structure of the law of standing . . . than . . . any other 
decision.”136 Yet Douglas was not its original author. Rather, it was 
William Brennan who wrote those revolutionary words. In the first 
draft of his opinion in Barlow, Brennan wrote that the test for standing 
“is satisfied when the plaintiff alleges, as petitioners’ complaint 
alleged here, that the challenged action has caused him substantial 
injury in fact.”137 The term “injury in fact” had apparently been coined 
by the scholar Kenneth Culp Davis a decade earlier,138 in what Cass 
Sunstein has called a “misreading” of the APA.139 
On January 5, 1970, Brennan wrote to Douglas, sharing a copy of 
his Barlow draft and telling Douglas that he wouldn’t circulate it to the 
rest of the Justices until they decided how they coordinate their 
respective opinions in these very similar cases.140 Brennan’s draft was 
read by Douglas’s sole clerk that term, Thomas C. Armitage, a recent 
graduate of UCLA Law School. Armitage concluded that Brennan’s 
analysis was “a useful addition to the law of standing.”141 He 
summarized Brennan’s opinion as asking the question of whether the 
defendant’s conduct caused the plaintiff “substantial injury in fact.”142 
“As long as such an allegation is made,” Armitage continued, “there is 
standing to sue, regardless of whether or not (a) the allegation of injury 
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is true, or (b) the injury invades a legally protected interest.”143 “If you 
agree to the present structure of Justice Brennan’s opinion,” Armitage 
wrote to Douglas, the Justice should add the question of whether the 
petitioner alleged “a substantial injury in fact.”144 “Discussions as to 
whether pet[itione]r was within the class or persons which the statute 
was designed to protect, etc., should be entirely excluded from this 
section, as that goes to the merits (i.e. whether there is a legally 
protected interest).”145 
Yet Douglas did not agree with Brennan’s structure. He felt it was  
important in a standing analysis to consider whether the injured 
interest fell “within the purview of the federal statute whose 
application is in question.”146 He wrote a brief letter to this effect to 
Brennan, also suggesting that Brennan modify “injury in fact” to 
specify harm that is “economic or otherwise.”147 Douglas then 
dispatched Armitage to talk to Brennan’s clerks. After a “long talk,” 
Armitage returned on January 9 to report that the Brennan clerks felt 
their boss would be amenable to revising his opinion accordingly.148 
Armitage also suggested that Douglas recommend to Brennan 
dropping the word “substantial” before “injury in fact.”149 Armitage 
felt that the word “substantial” modified Brennan’s opinion such that 
it might 
not adequately allow for the bringing of suits by plaintiffs 
with revolutionary ideas (previously unaccepted by courts), 
especially in the area of non-economic injuries . . . . The 
difficulty with the word ‘substantial’ is that it opens the door 
to a judge to say that an alleged non-economic injury is not 
‘substantial’ and therefore the plaintiff has no standing to 
sue. This would preclude a decision of the non-economic 
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claim on the merits, and could give conservative (and lazy) 
judges an easy way out.150 
On January 10, Armitage revised Douglas’s Data Processing draft, 
in an effort to get it in line with Brennan’s “injury in fact” test and 
Douglas’s statutory penumbra language.151 Douglas’s opinion now 
read: 
As in Barlow v. Collins . . . the first question is whether the 
plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him 
injury in fact, economic or otherwise . . . . the [second] 
question [is] whether the interest sought to be protected by 
the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be 
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional 
guarantee in question. Those interests, at times, may reflect 
‘aesthetic, conservational, and recreational’ as well as 
economic values.152 
Armitage cited Scenic Hudson to support this last proposition. 
Brennan, meanwhile, had written to Douglas to tell him that he liked 
the addition of “economic or otherwise,” but he couldn’t abide by the 
second part of Douglas’s analysis: what was now the “zone of 
interests” test.153 The two eventually decided that their views on the 
matter were “irreconcilable” and that they should “both circulate to see 
what reaction we get from the conference.”154 The other Justices 
received the drafts and promptly handed them to their clerks. From 
surviving correspondence, it appears that the clerks did not understand 
the significance of the dispute. One of Marshall’s clerks agreed with 
both opinions and felt the whole disagreement was semantic and 
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“really just shows the stupidity (did I say that) of assigning the two 
opinions to different people . . . . I would recommend that you let the 
two writers battle it out for a while.”155 One of White’s clerks, on the 
other hand, felt Brennan was closer to the mark but worried that either 
opinion would result in “[r]elaxation of the standing requirement—
allowing the litigation to proceed one more stage—[which] must tend 
to encourage consumer suits. Such suits are a complete economic 
waste; they enrich nobody but the lawyers and divert resources from 
true economic competition.”156 
Both Brennan and Douglas also wrote lengthy memos to the 
conference, further explaining their respective rationales.157 Douglas 
illustrated his “zone of interests” test with a remarkably prescient 
example: “That zone will differ from statute to statute. A zoning 
ordinance or an order of the Forest Service respecting a wilderness area 
might bring into focus a group of people who would have no possible 
standing under either of the statutes that we are considering in the 
present cases.”158 
In the end, the Justices agreed with Douglas. Brennan informed 
Burger that he’d decided to turn his majority opinion in Barlow into 
an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part.159 (Burger responded 
by lightheartedly mocking Brennan, referring to him as “vice Justice 
Brennan” in a memo sent to the whole conference.)160 Had the Justices 
been convinced in part by Douglas’s environmental example? Except 
timing—the memo with the example was sent shortly before the 
Justices chose Douglas’s approach over Brennan’s—there is no 
evidence one way or the other. Douglas took over writing the Barlow 
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opinion, and over the next couple weeks refined his Data Processing 
opinion further. In one of the final revisions, Armitage cut the line 
from the original draft about cases that “involve the public interest,” 
in which a “private attorney general [can] tender the questions on the 
merits.”161 “Since there is no express statutory standing provision in 
the statute in this case,” Armitage scrawled in the margin, “the ‘private 
atty general’ theory does not seem applicable.”162 
Because of Armitage’s influence, Douglas’s final language in Data 
Processing made no explicit reference to the old concept of “standing 
for the public.” Instead, he articulated what would become the 
structure of standing inquiries for years to come: 
The first question is whether the plaintiff alleges that the 
challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or 
otherwise . . . . [T]he [second] question [is] whether the 
interest to be protected by the complaint is arguably within 
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the 
statute or constitutional guarantee in question . . . . That 
interest, at times, may reflect ‘aesthetic, conservational, and 
recreational’ as well as economic values.163 
If the answer to both questions was yes, then the plaintiff had 
standing.164 Douglas’s brief opinion in Barlow relied on Data 
Processing’s two-part test.165 Yet in a footnote in Data Processing, 
Douglas did add language heavily drawn from Armitage’s handwritten 
comment: another test for standing, “which rests on an explicit 
provision in a regulatory statute conferring standing and . . . 
commonly referred to in terms of allowing suits by ‘private attorneys 
general,’ is inapplicable to the present case.”166 He did not pass 
judgment on this test, but seemed to implicitly affirm it. 
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Brennan (joined by White)167 concurred in the result in both cases 
yet dissented from the Court’s reasoning. “My view is that the inquiry 
in the Court’s first step is the only one that need be made to determine 
standing,” he wrote.168 So long as there is an “injury in fact, economic 
or otherwise,” there is standing;169 the second step should not be part 
of the standing analysis, but rather “to determine an aspect of 
reviewability, that is, whether Congress meant to deny or to allow 
judicial review of the agency action at the instance of the plaintiff.”170 
Toward the end of his discussion of standing, Brennan included a 
footnote elaborating on his definition of injury in fact. This injury “has 
generally been economic in nature,” he wrote, “but it need not be.”171 
He cited Scenic Hudson.172 Brennan then continued: 
The plaintiffs in the present cases alleged distinctive and 
discriminating harm, obviously linked to the agency action. 
Thus, I do not consider what must be alleged to satisfy the 
standing requirement by parties who have sustained no 
special harm themselves but sue rather as taxpayers or 
citizens to vindicate the interests of the general public.173 
Thus, though they both mentioned it, neither Brennan nor Douglas 
outright affirmed the old concept of standing for the public. Such 
silence, and Douglas’s new “injury in fact” plus “zone of interests” test 
would be the old concept’s undoing. 
Douglas’s Data Processing opinion (heavily influenced by 
Brennan’s first draft) did, in the opinion’s aftermath, expand “the class 
of persons who had standing to challenge administrative action,” wrote 
Elizabeth Magill.174 Yet the opinion also “butchered the prior law”; 
plus, “[i]t was in the aftermath of Data Processing that the standing 
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for the public principle died in the Supreme Court.”175 It is apparent 
from the Justices’ papers that they did not consider how drastically 
their decision departed from the way courts (including the Supreme 
Court) thought of standing prior to the mid-twentieth century; it is 
equally apparent that they had given little thought to how Data 
Processing and Barlow would affect standing for the public. They had 
both almost affirmed the concept, but then both (somewhat 
inexplicably) backed away. 
As America entered the 1970s, some were already tired of debating 
standing. “There is already an enormous and adequate literature on the 
law of standing,” lamented Louis L. Jaffe in 1971.176 But the true fights 
were still to come. 
C. Blackmun’s Forgotten Fight: Sierra Club v. Morton 
Barely six months after the Court announced its decisions in Data 
Processing and Barlow, the Sierra Club filed a petition for certiorari.177 
The Club had challenged the U.S. Forest Service’s decision to grant a 
permit to the Walt Disney Company to turn Mineral King Valley into 
a huge commercial ski resort. Now it was appealing a Ninth Circuit 
ruling that had denied the Club standing to sue.178 The Club made two 
arguments to the Justices. The first was that the Club deserved standing 
because it had suffered an injury in fact—an injury based on the Club’s 
profound interest in preserving Mineral King. The second was more 
implicit, yet ultimately it would hold more sway with the Justices: that 
the Court had to rule in the Club’s favor because of the “crucial 
significance” of this case to the conservation movement; this was 
about protecting the environment.179 
In the end, neither argument would prevail. The Sierra Club had 
erred in failing to clearly make an argument that fragmentary evidence 
suggests might have worked: that the Club had standing to sue not 
because it had suffered an injury, but because it was standing for the 
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public. Nonetheless, the deeper story of this case and the Justices’ 
deliberations remain instructive to us in the present. This story reveals 
that the Justices still did not intend to eliminate the concept of standing 
for the public, and that Blackmun may have been ignorant of its basics. 
Nonetheless, he supported it using other words, in a subtly radical if 
sadly forgotten dissent, and also articulated a key reason why we must 
revisit the current standing doctrine: environmental cases are simply 
different. 
1. The Case 
In 1965, the U.S. Forest Service invited private investors to develop 
“an extensive winter and summer recreation site” at Mineral King 
Valley, a seven-mile-long glacial valley bordering Sequoia National 
Park.180 The winning bid—$35 million, twice the cost of Disneyland—
came from the Walt Disney Company, which proposed to build an 
“American Alpine Wonderland”—a massive ski resort.181 Walt Disney 
himself had been quietly buying property around Mineral King for 
years and had donated generously to Governor Ronald Reagan’s 
campaign in an effort to ensure California’s support for the project.182 
For three years following the Forest Service’s initial nod, the Disney 
Company worked to create a final plan. It did not anticipate that fierce 
opposition would arise.183 Yet arise it did, with a vengeance, when, in 
1965, the Sierra Club began militating against the project. 
Founded in 1892, the Sierra Club was one of the oldest and most 
venerated environmental organizations in the country. By the 1950s, 
the Club was beginning to expand its reach beyond California and to 
fight more forcefully to protect public lands.184 Whereas in the 1940s 
the Club had actually voted to support development in Mineral King, 
and in the 1950s the Club had made Walt Disney an honorary life 
member, now it would have to rethink things.185 Club members had 
carefully tracked Walt Disney’s land acquisitions in the early 1960s, 
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and shortly after Disney won a preliminary permit to begin developing 
the land in 1965, the Sierra Club voted to oppose any development at 
Mineral King—a “magnificent area” where many Club members loved 
to hike and camp.186 Club officials wrote to the Park Service to object 
to plans to build a highway into Mineral King.187 When that didn’t 
work, they proposed that Mineral King be annexed to Sequoia National 
Park and requested a public hearing from the Forest Service.188 When 
that didn’t work, the Club launched a full-scale media campaign to 
raise awareness.189 Still, the plan moved forward. 
At a meeting on January 21, 1968, the Sierra Club’s Board of 
Directors discussed “legal action” for the first time. It seemed the only 
way forward, and Club members had been inspired by the success of 
the Scenic Hudson litigation three years before.190 Club officials 
considered the Forest Service to be “openly obsessed with 
development.”191 And in the Forest Service’s zeal to allow Disney to 
develop Mineral King, they believed, the government had failed to 
perform a thorough assessment of the environmental impacts the 
project would have.192 
So, on June 5, 1969, the Club sued several federal officials to stop 
the project from going forward, including Interior Secretary Walter 
Hickel, the named defendant. (He would later be replaced as named 
defendant following the confirmation of a new Interior Secretary, 
Rogers Morton.) In its complaint, the Club alleged that the 
government’s issuance of permits to Disney was “not in accordance 
with law, [was] arbitrary and capricious and constitute[s] an abuse of 
discretion.”193 The project, the Club continued, would cause 
irreparable harm to Mineral King.194 Aware of the holding of Scenic 
Hudson, the Club anticipated that standing would be an issue in this 
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case. So the Club wrote, “For many years the SIERRA CLUB by its 
activities and conduct has exhibited a special interest in the 
conservation and the sound maintenance of the national parks, game 
refuges and forests of the country, regularly serving as a responsible 
representative of persons similarly interested.”195 
At the hearing, federal attorneys argued (among other things) that 
the Sierra Club did not have standing to sue.196 In its brief to the trial 
court, recounted Club member Tom Turner: 
“the Sierra Club had argued it should be granted standing 
simply because its very purpose for existence was the 
preservation of the Sierra Nevada. The plaintiff asked 
rhetorically: ‘If the Sierra Club may not be heard, then who 
speaks for the future generations for whose benefit Congress 
intended the fragile Sierra bowls and valleys to be 
preserved? If the Sierra Club does not have standing, then 
who may question the threatened illegal acts of the 
secretaries to whom this unique and irreplaceable natural 
resource has been entrusted?’”197  
Later, in a brief replying to the government’s arguments at the 
hearing, the Club cited Justice Harlan’s dissent in Flast, though this 
was more in service of a rhetorical point than it was a clear invocation 
of standing for the public.198 
District Court Judge William Sweigert ruled against the 
government, enjoining the issuance of the permit to Disney and of a 
right-of-way permit to California for routing a highway through 
Sequoia National Park (which was necessary for the Mineral King 
project).199 “Judge Sweigert was not at all bothered by the Club’s 
broad claim of standing,” recalled Turner.200 Sweigert cited Scenic 
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Hudson to support his ruling.201 On February 9, 1970, federal attorneys 
appealed Judge Sweigert’s decision to the Ninth Circuit. Their main 
contention was that the defendants had not exceeded the limits of their 
discretionary authority, but they also challenged the Club’s standing to 
sue, on the grounds that the Club “fails to establish infringement of 
any legally protected interest belonging to it.”202 
On September 16, 1970, six months after the Supreme Court’s 
rulings in Data Processing and Barlow, a Ninth Circuit panel voted 2-
to-1 that the Sierra Club did not have standing to sue. In its analysis of 
the current standing doctrine, the Ninth Circuit first quoted from a 
1943 Second Circuit decision affirming that “Congress can 
constitutionally enact a statute” giving a person or class of persons 
standing to sue “even if the sole purpose is to vindicate the public 
interest.”203 “More recently,” however, a “profusion of cases . . . have 
developed new precedents on the law of standing.”204 These included 
Flast, Data Processing, and Barlow.205 The Ninth Circuit then ran 
through the “injury in fact” analysis (the Ninth Circuit considered the 
“zone of interests” test to be “not entirely clear” and pretty much 
ignored it), concluding that, in spite of Data Processing’s language 
about “aesthetic, conservational or recreational” injuries, no members 
of the Sierra Club “would be affected by the actions of defendants-
appellants other than the fact that the actions are personally displeasing 
or distasteful to them.”206 This was not enough for standing. As to the 
concept of standing for the public, the Ninth Circuit accepted it, but 
wrote that “that rule is limited . . . to cases where Congress has enacted 
a statute conferring on any non-official person, or on a group of non-
official persons, authority to bring a suit to prevent unauthorized 
official action . . . . We find no indication in any federal statute that 
Congress has conferred on the Sierra Club or any group like it, 
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authority to bring suits to challenge official action.”207 Somewhat 
confusingly, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the notion that Section 10 of 
the APA could confer such authority on the Club, citing Data 
Processing’s demand of an injury in fact.208 
The Sierra Club immediately announced its intention to appeal to 
the Supreme Court, and the Ninth Circuit agreed to keep Judge 
Sweigert’s injunction in place until the Court ruled.209 In its petition 
for certiorari, the Club articulated two theories to support its bid for 
standing: first, it passed the Data Processing test, and second, the Club 
was acting in the public interest. The Club dismissed the idea, 
proposed by the Ninth Circuit (and later embraced by the Court), that 
it might have standing if it joined its claim with “local residents and 
users.”210 “A viable rule cannot rest upon such a fragile distinction,” 
wrote the Club.211 “Either the Sierra Club has standing in its own right, 
or it does not. The question is an important one, and this court should 
decide it.”212 Yet the Club added that this case was of “crucial 
significance” because it was in the “conservation field”: “If left 
unreversed, this case will cripple efforts of conservation groups to 
represent the public interest.”213 However, other than name-checking 
“the public interest” several times,214 the Club did not expound upon 
the old concept of standing for the public. This was odd, considering 
the fact that the Ninth Circuit had embraced this concept in a footnote. 
Later, in its reply brief to the Court, the Club repeated this tactic. Its 
argument primarily relied on Data Processing, which “said that injury 
to aesthetic, conservational, and recreational values may be advanced 
by an appropriate litigant as a basis for standing. In opposing the Sierra 
Club’s standing in this case, the Government necessarily challenges 
that decision.”215 Yet the Club went perhaps too far in its embrace of 
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Data Processing’s “injury in fact” and “zone of interests” analysis. 
The Club noted that it was “not merely claiming the right, possessed 
by every citizen, to require that the Government be administered 
according to the law,” but rather was asserting that it had “a plain, 
direct, and adequate interest” that the government was harming.216 In 
arguing to expand the definition of injury in fact to include aesthetic 
and other non-economic concerns, the Club strategically embraced the 
Court’s apparent leaning and moved away from its earlier argument 
for the old concept of standing for the public.217 Yet this tactic may 
have been a mistake, given the language in both Douglas’s and 
Brennan’s Data Processing and Barlow opinions that pointedly stated 
that they were not ruling on the old concept. 
In its filings to the Court, the Club’s approach to the standing issue 
was deliberate and calculated—if ultimately misguided. In a 1975 
interview, Club attorney Richard Leonard maintained: 
Now, it should be clearly understood that the Sierra Club had 
deliberately not stated its own personal harm—the fact that 
it had taken trips into the area and its members personally 
used the area—because it felt that it was much more 
important to state the general principles that the Park Service 
and the Forest Service were violating acts of Congress and 
somebody had to have the right to protest. The Court of 
Appeals held that the secretaries of Agriculture and Interior 
are supposed to take care of the public interest. But they 
weren’t. So the Sierra Club felt that somebody in the public 
had to have the right to request corrective action . . . .218 
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Yet it must be understood that the Club was not invoking the old 
concept of standing for the public; rather, it was claiming that it had 
suffered an injury, on account of its interest in Mineral King, and that 
the Club (more than any ordinary member of the public) was uniquely 
well suited to bring this suit. The Club’s legal strategy, Leonard 
maintained, was “to test the general principle, that the Sierra Club as a 
responsible organization, eighty years old, experienced in the field of 
environmental matters, could raise questions as to environmental 
judgment of the Forest Service or Park Service or others . . . .”219 
At this time, the Club was also launching a broader legal campaign 
to protect the environment. Even as Club members appealed to the 
Supreme Court, other Club attorneys approached the Ford Foundation 
to apply for funds to establish the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund. 
After receiving a $98,000 grant in the spring of 1971, this Fund 
became a reality.220 It still exists today, known as Earthjustice. 
In its filings to the Court, the Sierra Club made two arguments: it 
claimed that this case was of “crucial significance” because it was an 
environmental case, and it claimed that it had suffered a unique injury 
in fact, on account of its long-standing interest in Mineral King. The 
first argument would ultimately end up carrying more weight with the 
Justices than the second argument. Yet neither argument would prove 
persuasive enough to secure the victory the Club wanted. And, in the 
end, neither argument was the most powerful one the Sierra Club could 
have made: that it was standing for the public, not because of any 
injury, not because of its expertise, but simply because of the “crucial 
significance” of protecting the environment. 
2. The Deliberations 
The case of Mineral King had resonated deeply with many members 
of the public, especially young people. This was surely not because of 
their avid interest in the intricacies of the standing doctrine. Rather, it 
was because this was an environmental case—one about protecting a 
beautiful and wild piece of land. “I myself feel that if Disney does 
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build this resort, he will destroy the area,” one young man wrote to 
Justice Douglas in the fall of 1971.221 
If you have ever been to Yosemite National Park, you would 
know what tourists do to a place as that. The natural ecology 
of the Yosemite Valley has been ruined . . . . Now I’m 18 
years old and I’m sorry to say that if big business keeps on 
having its way that by the time I get older and have kids there 
will not be any place such as this to vacation. Please think of 
people like me when you vote on this issue . . . . [K]eep 
Mineral King primitive so others can enjoy its natural 
beauty . . . .222 
Months earlier, Douglas had received another letter from another 
young man, this one a second-year law student at the University of 
California, Santa Clara. “Knowing that you have long been concerned 
about our environment,” he wrote, “I feel that you, perhaps more than 
your fellow Justices, realize the importance of standing for 
environmental litigants.”223 
Several of the Justices’ clerks, too, were apparently moved by 
environmental concerns. “There is no doubt in my mind that the large 
scale development planned here would change the wilderness to such 
an extent that the natural state could not be restored for quite some 
time,” Blackmun clerk Michael A. LaFond wrote in a memo arguing 
that the Sierra Club had standing.224 “This case is of great importance 
in light of the growing concern about the quality of our natural 
environment,” added Marshall clerk Paul Gewirtz.225 “The effect of 
the [Ninth Circuit’s] decision below is to make it impossible for 
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environmental interests to be represented in court. (Who will represent 
them?) There is no reason for the Court to want this result.”226 
The Justice that environmental activists believed would be their 
most natural ally was William O. Douglas. There had never been as 
ardent a conservationist as Douglas on the Court. A hiker and lover of 
nature since early childhood, the author of books on the wonders of the 
outdoors and an activist (even in his later years) for preserving wild 
places, Douglas had been a Sierra Club member for decades. In 1959, 
after two decades on the Court, he had been voted a life member; two 
years later, he was elected to its board of directors. As a Supreme Court 
Justice, Douglas advocated for stronger public control over public 
lands; sought to have the Court condemn DDT; and generally pushed 
to have the Court address matters through the lens of 
environmentalism.227 Yet in late 1962, Douglas resigned from the 
board—”because,” as a clerk later summarized, “Sierra Club [is] now 
engaging in litigation”—but he remained a member of the Club until 
December 1970, by which time he gave up his life membership, 
worried it could delegitimize his environmental votes.228 
As Sierra Club neared oral arguments, Douglas dispatched his 
clerks to research both the case and his history with the Club.229 
Clearly, he was concerned about the appearance of bias. His vote in 
the case itself would prove to be far less complicated. Kenneth R. 
Reed, Douglas’s clerk assigned to look into the arguments, concluded 
that the Sierra Club had a slam-dunk case for standing. “The standing 
question is not much in issue before this Court,” he wrote.230 Reed also 
noted the environmental harm that would occur if the Club lost. “The 
construction [of the ski resort] would require extensive bulldozing of 
heretofore wilderness land, it would necessitate blasting and rock 
removal, and alterations of mountain slopes,” he wrote.231 
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The Justice that few expected to be a secret crusader for the 
environment was Harry Blackmun. Only appointed to the Court a year 
earlier, Blackmun had been personally very close to the conservative 
Chief Justice Burger since kindergarten, and in his first years on the 
Court his voting record mirrored Burger’s: Blackmun voted like the 
lifelong Republican that he was. Yet unbeknownst to most, Blackmun 
was struggling with his ideology, as well as his perception that several 
of his colleagues—Douglas above all—didn’t respect him.232 When it 
came to Sierra Club, Blackmun concluded that the Club did have 
standing—apparently largely because of the depth of its interest in the 
environment. “Ten years ago Sierra would have had no recognizable 
standing,” Blackmun wrote in a memo to himself a few days before 
oral arguments.233 
On the other hand, I think this Court in the [D]ata 
[P]rocessing and related cases has gone far down the road to 
uphold standing in a litigant. If it can be shown that there is 
some [e]ffect upon the litigant, then it seems he has standing. 
This, of course, can be carried too far. On the other hand, 
with the broad environmental purposes of Sierra and with 
the members of Sierra enjoying the particular region in 
which this project is to be placed, it seems to me that there 
ought to be enough here for standing. Furthermore, if an 
organization of this kind does not have standing, who does? 
It would be hard to find someone else other than a resident 
in the immediate vicinity. These are probably few, if any 
exist at all, because of the wilderness character of the area 
and the substantial reach of federal lands. Certainly Sierra is 
a responsible representative.234 
Yet it also appears that Blackmun may have been unaware that, quite 
apart from Data Processing injury in fact requirement, there was 
another way litigants had historically gotten standing: by suing on 
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behalf of the public, enabled by a statutory right of action (in this case, 
Section 10 of the APA).235 In a bench memo one of Blackmun’s clerks 
had written, “In the absence of special legislation, a party whose only 
interest is in having the law obeyed should have no standing to sue.”236 
The clerk’s first clause was obliquely dismissing the legitimacy of 
statutory grants of standing for the uninjured, to stand on behalf of the 
public. Yet Blackmun wrote a question mark in the margin next to that 
sentence, possibly indicating he was unfamiliar with this doctrine or 
confused by the clerk’s comment.237 
Oral arguments took place on November 17, 1971. According to 
Blackmun’s hastily scrawled notes, the Sierra Club’s attorney, Leland 
R. Selna, Jr.—a tall young man, nice-looking and with a good voice, 
in Blackmun’s eyes—began at 11:07 am.238 He attempted to make a 
number of points: demonstrate that the Club satisfied the “injury in 
fact” and “zone of interests” test; argue that organizations (and even 
individuals) should have standing in their area of “special expertise” 
because of that expertise; and, finally, that the environmental stakes in 
this case were very high.239 Selna noted early on that the Disney 
Company itself had described Mineral King as “unsurpassed in natural 
splendor, perhaps more similar to the European Alps than any other 
area in the United States and generously endowed with lakes, streams, 
cascades, caverns and matchless mountain visitors.”240 Yet Selna also 
suggested that its view of standing based on “special expertise” and 
demonstrated interest was not limited to the environment. As the 
scholar Peter Manus noted, “The Sierra Club’s attorney . . . did not 
consistently assert that the private attorneys general he urged the Court 
to recognize were limited to environmental advocates able to convince 
a court of their genuine dedication to the public’s interest. Nor did the 
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Sierra Club’s attorney clearly assert why the Court should logically 
limits its expansion of standing to such advocates.”241 
In his statements to the Justices, Selna invoked the language of 
standing for the public, but he did so without embracing the old 
doctrine. Rather, he seemed to use this language to bolster his 
argument that the Club had sustained an injury in fact, and that it was 
within the zone of interests. For instance, when discussing Data 
Processing and Scenic Hudson, Selna said, “Those were cases in 
which organizations’ aesthetic or conservational or recreational 
interests were sufficiently aggrieved, to permit them to represent the 
public interest.”242 Thus, while the Club was arguing to expand the 
definition of injury in fact, it situated its argument squarely in those 
terms. 
This is perplexing, because there were indications to suggest that 
some Justices might have been open to the older concept of standing 
for the public. For instance, in his only questions during oral 
arguments, Douglas asked Solicitor General Erwin Griswold (arguing 
for Interior Secretary Morton) about Michigan’s recently passed law, 
which automatically gave standing to anyone to bring suit “for the 
protection of the air, water and other natural resources and the public 
trust therein from pollution, impairment or destruction,”243 and asked 
if Congress could do the same.244 Griswold replied that it could, and 
made reference to the government’s brief. There, the government had 
noted that the Club could have claimed standing for the public if 
Congress had enacted a statute creating a private right of action—
”indeed, there are bills presently pending in Congress which would 
confer standing on citizens and groups such as the Sierra Club with 
respect to a broad range of environmental-public interest issues”—yet 
such was not before the Court.245 (This last assumption reflected a 
misunderstanding of the APA, the framers of which had intended it to 
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do just that: assure a private right of action when agencies shirk their 
duties.)246 
Yet if Douglas and Griswold were aware of this possibility, 
Blackmun again gave no such indication. His questions were focused 
on defining the limits of the standing requirements the Club wanted 
the Court to embrace. Blackmun asked Selna whether “a broad general 
interest [in] the problems of ecology” was enough for standing in this 
case?247 Surely that interest had to be more specific to give a plaintiff 
standing? Selna replied that an organization “would have to have 
competence in the area in which it sought to represent the public 
interest or it would not be able to do it.”248 Crucially, Selna framed his 
answer in terms of Data Processing and its injury in fact requirement.  
“Now, because the Sierra Club represents not only itself but 
the public interests, the Government is wrong in its argument 
that injury to the public demands a special statutory grant 
of—in order to permit standing [sic]. But [the] Data 
Processing case already answered that argument when it 
recognized that widely held aesthetic conservational and 
recreational values which by their nature affect the public 
could be a basis for standing.”249  
Once again, the Sierra Club chose to frame its argument in terms of 
an injury (albeit an aesthetic one), not true standing for the public. 
Two days later, on November 19, 1971, the Justices met to discuss 
the case. Chief Justice Burger went first. According to Douglas’s and 
Blackmun’s scrawled notes, he told the other Justices that he simply 
could not accept standing here—if the Sierra Club had standing, where 
would it stop? How much judicial surveillance of administrative 
actions could they allow? The end result would be the immobilization 
of the government. Yet he would not be opposed to signing on to a 
narrow opinion—for instance, one affirming standing based on the 
                                                                 
 246. Sunstein, supra note 22, at 185–86. 
 247. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 239, at 13. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 14. 
2018] STANDING FOR EVERYONE 67 
 
injury to Club members who could no longer hike on trails in Mineral 
King.250 
Next it was Douglas’s turn to speak. He passed.251 Brennan dwelt on 
the injury-in-fact requirement from Data Processing—he hadn’t been 
convinced that the Club had suffered an injury based on the evidence 
presented, but he agreed with Burger that this might be different had 
the Court seen evidence of the Club members’ use of the area. He was 
not set in his conclusions, though. Brennan finished by expressing his 
hope that the Court would clarify that injuries could be aesthetic as 
well as economic. White went next, and said he hoped the Court would 
not do that in this case. Perhaps more than his colleagues, White was 
opposed to what the Club was trying to do—not everyone in the United 
States could be a private attorney general, he said. Stewart largely 
agreed. He began by saying he simply couldn’t agree with the district 
court; he thought the Ninth Circuit had gotten it right. Unlike Burger, 
he saw no need to issue a narrow ruling.252 
According to Douglas’s notes, Marshall spoke next and did not say 
much. He would vote to affirm the Ninth Circuit. Blackmun—the most 
junior justice, and thus the last to vote—professed himself to be at 
roughly the same place as Brennan—there might be standing based on 
the interests of environmentally-minded Club members.253 Finally 
attention turned back to Douglas, who was the last to speak. Again, 
Douglas would not vote one way or the other; he told the other Justices 
that he may end up not participating, as he’d been a member of the 
Sierra Club for years, and spent time on its Board of Directors, even 
though he’d resigned his membership the year before.254 
After the conference ended, Blackmun jotted down some notes to 
himself. They express his profound uncertainty about what to do. In 
his messy shorthand, he wrote, “Standing—I feel Data P & other cases 
have opened the way. I see the open door, but what is it . . . [?] If 
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standing is apparent, injunctive relief is less important. But I would 
grant injunctive relief.”255 
With Burger, White, Stewart, and Marshall voting to affirm the 
Ninth Circuit, there was an outright majority prepared to deny the 
Sierra Club standing (since only seven Justices were voting). Chief 
Justice Burger assigned Potter Stewart to write the majority opinion. 
Stewart’s first draft was nearly identical to his final one.256 In both, he 
began by recognizing Mineral King’s “great natural beauty.”257 He 
then reviewed the standing doctrine—the “injury in fact” and “zone of 
interests” test.258 Crucially, Stewart clarified that harm to one’s 
“[a]esthetic and recreational” values could count as interests that could 
be injured, but he added “the ‘injury in fact’ test requires more than an 
injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review 
be himself among the injured.”259 The only fact revealed in Stewart’s 
papers is that he added one of the most critical lines of his opinion—
the footnoted sentence clarifying, “[o]ur decision does not, of course, 
bar the Sierra Club from seeking in the District Court to amend its 
complaint . . . “—in a later draft.260 This footnote was to a section 
lamenting that the Club had “failed to allege that it or its members 
would be affected in any of their activities or pastimes by the Disney 
development. Nowhere in the pleadings or affidavits did the Club state 
that its members used Mineral King for any purpose, much less that 
they used it in any way that would be significantly affected by the 
proposed actions of the respondents.”261 This was the section that 
none-too-subtly told the Club how it could acceptably gain standing. 
In both his original and final drafts, Stewart also directly addressed 
the possibility of standing for the public:  
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The Club apparently regarded any allegations of 
individualized injury as superfluous, on the theory that this 
was a ‘public’ action involving questions as to the use of 
natural resources, and that the Club’s longstanding concern 
with and expertise in such matters were sufficient to give it 
standing as a ‘representative of the public.’ This theory 
reflects a misunderstanding of our cases involving so-called 
‘public actions’ in the area of administrative law.262  
The Club, according to Stewart, had misstated precedent. According 
to the Justice, the line of cases allowing plaintiffs to stand for the 
public had established the following proposition: “the fact of economic 
injury is what gives a person standing to seek judicial review . . . .”263 
Stewart’s account of doctrine was blatantly ahistorical. “Actually, 
no,” wrote Elizabeth Magill of Stewart’s “revisionist version of the 
history of standing doctrine.”264 “Prior to 1970,” a statutory provision 
alone, without an individualized injury (economic or otherwise), could 
permit “aggrieved parties to challenge administrative action.”265 In 
Sierra Club, Stewart used his framing of history to justify expanding 
injury-in-fact to include non-economic injuries while demanding an 
injury in all cases.266 Stewart’s account of the Sierra Club’s arguments 
was also incorrect. In its briefs and during oral argument, the Club had 
made the tactical decision to frame its argument in terms of “injury in 
fact” and the Club’s unique expertise in environmental matters. This 
implicitly rejected the idea that an uninjured party or an ordinary 
member of the public would have the ability to stand for the public if 
enabled by a statutory right of action (such as Section 10 of the APA). 
Stewart and the majority readily accepted this Data Processing injury 
requirement, even as it rejected the Club’s more prosaic arguments. 
Stewart’s opinion would be the one embraced by a majority of 
Justices, but Douglas’s opinion would be the one to go down in history. 
The origin of this famous opinion has been well documented. 
Christopher Stone, a young law professor at the University of Southern 
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California, had been toying around the idea of whether “natural 
objects”—forests, rivers, lakes, and the like—could have rights of their 
own. Could a polluted river, say, sue its polluter? In October 1971, in 
USC’s library, Stone read the Ninth Circuit opinion in Sierra Club v. 
Hickel, which immediately struck him as “the ready-made vehicle to 
bring to the Court’s attention the theory that was taking shape in my 
mind.”267 Stone knew he had to act quickly. He wanted to write an 
article in the Southern California Law Review, but it wouldn’t be 
published in time. Yet in a stroke of extraordinary luck, Justice 
Douglas was scheduled to write the preface for the Review’s next issue; 
if he hurried, Stone could write his article and have it sent with all of 
the other drafted articles for that issue to Douglas in December. 
Writing at breakneck speed, Stone managed to finish his now-
legendary article, Should Trees Have Standing?—Toward Legal 
Rights for Natural Objects,268 in a matter of weeks.269 
The article traced the evolution of legal rights for those who 
formerly lacked them—women, children, the elderly, imprisoned 
people, the mentally ill, “Blacks, fetuses, and Indians,” as well as 
corporations—to conclude, “I am quite seriously proposing that we 
give legal rights to forests, oceans, rivers and other so-called ‘natural 
objects’ in the environment—indeed, to the natural environment as a 
whole.”270 Practically speaking, of course, a tree cannot sue on its own. 
Thus, “when a friend of a natural object perceives it to be endangered, 
he can apply to a court for the creation of a guardianship,” and then 
sue on its behalf.271 This would be similar to legal guardianship for 
children or the mentally “incompetent.” The Sierra Club could be such 
a guardian for Mineral King.272 This article was mailed off to Douglas 
in December.273 
Should Trees Have Standing? impressed the environmentally-
minded Justice very deeply. It is possibly what convinced him not to 
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recuse himself. In the first draft of his dissent, handwritten on a yellow 
legal pad, Douglas wrote that the “problem” of standing “would be 
simplified and also put neatly in focus if we fashioned a federal rule 
that allowed environmental issues to be litigated before federal 
agencies or federal courts in the name of the inanimate object about to 
be despoiled or whose despoilment is the subject of public outrage. 
This suit would therefore be more properly labeled as Mineral King v. 
Morton.”274 Inanimate objects like ships and corporations, he noted, 
are sometimes parties in litigation, and they have legal personhood for 
“purposes of the adjudicatory processes”—”So it should be as respects 
valleys, alpine meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, 
groves of trees, swamplands, or even air that feels the destructive 
pressures of modern technology and modern life.”275 Practically 
speaking, nature could be represented by “those people who have so 
frequented the place as to know its values and wonders . . . .”276 
Douglas stressed that this would simply allow natural objects to have 
their day in court. “Perhaps they will not win. Perhaps the bulldozers 
of ‘progress’ will plow under all the aesthetic wonders of this beautiful 
land. That is not the present question. The sole question is, who has 
standing to be heard?”277 
In the months that followed, Douglas’s opinion changed only 
slightly, yet the changes were significant. He and his clerks revised the 
first several paragraphs so that they more directly credited Stone, and 
they revised the language to make it somewhat more prosaic. For 
instance, “the inanimate object about to be despoiled or whose 
despoilment is the subject of public outrage” became “the inanimate 
object about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and 
bulldozers and where injury is the subject of public outrage.”278 Note, 
however, that this addition also introduced the word “injury” into 
Douglas’s opinion. This was not accidental. Douglas and his clerks 
considered Mineral King’s standing to hinge on “a showing of ‘injury 
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in fact’ (to the Valley).”279 And Douglas appears to have been wary of 
the notion of standing for the public, at least as it was presented to him. 
“‘[P]ublic interest’ has so many differing shades of meaning as to be 
quite meaningless on the environmental front,” he wrote.280 
Douglas circulated a draft of his dissent to the other Justices on 
February 14, 1972—Valentine’s Day.281 The next day, one of 
Blackmun’s clerks wrote to his boss that Stewart had “resolved the 
standing issue correctly,” but “Justice Douglas’[s] opinion is 
delightful. No doubt he enjoyed writing it. While I would prefer to join 
the opinion of Justice Stewart, the suggestion of Justice Douglas 
should not be discarded or given no recognition.”282 Blackmun had 
been wrestling with the case for months, and he waited to read 
Douglas’s and Stewart’s opinions before writing his own. “I concur in 
much of my brother Stewart’s opinion which, as I understand it, 
acknowledges that the Sierra Club can maintain standing . . . if it can 
establish the (extensive?) use by its members of Mineral King,” he 
began his first draft.283 
But I cannot agree to a disposition of the case that in effect 
sanctions the Disney Development without our even 
considering the strength of petitioner’s substantive claims of 
illegality, simply on account of the peculiar history and 
posture of the case. 
 
I might feel differently were this obviously a test case on a 
narrow issue of standing, and it was clear that the merits 
                                                                 
 279. Letter from William H. Alsup to William O. Douglas (Feb. 21, 1972) (on file 
in Law Clerk Folder, Box 1545, Douglas Papers). 
 280. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 745 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Manus, supra 
note 34, at 144–45 (“The distinction between the outraged public Justice Douglas 
admired and the propaganda-led flock he disdained is foggy at best, leaving a reader 
unclear about whether Justice Douglas supported, rejected, or merely disregarded the 
Sierra Club’s argument that environmental claims are public claims that may be 
brought by private parties.”) 
 281. William O. Douglas, Draft Dissent, Sierra Club v. Morton (Feb. 14, 1972) 
(on file in Law Clerk Folder, Box 1545, Douglas Papers). 
 282. Letter from Michael A. LaFond to Harry Blackmun (Feb. 15, 1972) (on file 
in Folder 7, Box 137, Blackmun Papers). 
 283. Harry Blackmun, First Draft Dissent at 1, Sierra Club v. Morton (on file in 
Folder 7, Box 137, Blackmun Papers). 
2018] STANDING FOR EVERYONE 73 
 
could be pursued in an orderly fashion following this Court’s 
decision on the narrow issue. But the background of this suit, 
and the Sierra Club’s historic involvement in fighting to 
preserve the natural beauty and character of Mineral King 
Valley, demonstrate that the issues the Court today does not 
reach are the heart of this case. Not only are these issues, 
many of which plow new ground, crucial to the future of 
Mineral King. Several raise important ramifications for the 
quality of public land management throughout the Nation.284 
Blackmun wrote that where a “traditional interest analysis” would 
give standing (say, based on Club members’ interest in keeping a 
valley where they hiked and camped from being spoiled), such an 
analysis is “quite appropriate.”285 But where such an analysis would 
not work, “I would not hesitate to look more directly to the purposes 
on which the traditional analysis was founded: the existence of a real 
dispute and important interests at stake; the assurance of genuine 
adversariness; and some guarantee that the party whose standing is 
challenged will adequately represent the interests he asserts.”286 
In subsequent drafts, Blackmun would clarify his prose and his 
thinking. His dissent would eventually read, in part: 
If this were an ordinary case, I would join the opinion and 
the Court’s judgment and be quite content. 
 
But this is not ordinary, run-of-the-mill litigation. The case 
poses—if only we choose to acknowledge and reach them—
significant aspects of a wide, growing, and disturbing 
problem, that is, the Nation’s and the world’s deteriorating 
environment with its resulting ecological disturbances. Must 
our law be so rigid and our procedural concepts so inflexible 
that we render ourselves helpless when the existing methods 
and the traditional concepts do not quite fit and do not prove 
to be entirely adequate for new issues? 
. . . . 
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Rather than pursue the course the Court has chosen to take 
by its affirmance of the judgment of the Court of Appeals, I 
would adopt one of two alternatives: 
1. I would reverse that judgment and, instead, approve 
the judgment of the District Court which recognized 
standing in the Sierra Club and granted preliminary 
relief. I would be willing to do this on condition that the 
Sierra Club forthwith amend its complaint to meet the 
specifications the Court prescribes for standing. 
. . . . 
2. Alternatively, I would permit an imaginative 
expansion of our traditional concepts of standing in 
order to enable an organization such as the Sierra Club, 
possessed, as it is, of pertinent, bona fide, and well-
recognized attributes and purposes in the area of 
environment, to litigate environmental issues.287 
Thus, there would be standing in environmental cases for those who 
have “a provable, sincere, dedicated, and established status” as 
interested and qualified environmentalists, even—apparently—in the 
absence of a personal injury.288 
Blackmun and his clerks privately felt this disposition was superior, 
practically speaking, to Stewart’s and to the dissents. While Stewart’s 
opinion “would not be objectionable if this were really a test case on 
the legal doctrine of standing . . . this isn’t just a legal test case on a 
procedural issue, it goes to the entire project.”289 They also recognized 
that Douglas’s dissent was not as radical as it seemed from its bold 
rhetoric: 
Justice Douglas’s approach could lead to some strange 
results. But read carefully, the opinion is carefully structured 
to offer merely another route (another route of analysis) by 
which the Court could reach the same result Justice Stewart 
reaches: ‘standing for users.’ The thrust of the Douglas 
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opinion is not that somebody ought to start appointing 
guardians ad litem for trees, but that where a natural 
environmental ‘system’ is about to be substantially altered 
the courts should begin their standing inquiry from the 
system itself, and then ask whether the plaintiffs asserting 
standing have a sufficient connection with the system to 
assert a ‘litigable interest’ in it . . . . So viewed from this 
perspective, Douglas’s analysis is just an imaginative and 
novel method of arriving at Stewart’s result.290 
Only Blackmun’s opinion would allow for standing for 
environmental organizations in the absence of an injury in fact. 
In the weeks after the opinions were circulated, the other Justices 
decided which they would sign on to. White’s and Burger’s votes were 
never in question; they went with Stewart. Marshall’s vote seems less 
logical to a modern observer. As Robert V. Percival has noted, in spite 
of his clerk’s pleading, Marshall joined Stewart’s opinion just three 
days after it was circulated.291 (Douglas’s dissent was circulated the 
same day.) Marshall’s sparse papers do not reveal his rationale, but 
future opinions make clear that Marshall was surprisingly conservative 
when it came to standing.292 Brennan was apparently quite incensed 
by Stewart’s opinion, and on March 30, 1972, he circulated a draft 
dissent that began, “In my view this case should have been dismissed 
as improvidently granted.”293 Noting that “the Sierra Club and its 
members are in fact users of Mineral King,” he wrote that the Court 
should simply have remanded the case back to district court so the 
Club could frame its injury in those terms (as Blackmun suggested), 
rather than reaching a broader conclusion.294 Just days before the 
Court’s decision was announced, however, Brennan scrapped this 
dissent and replaced it with a much shorter one.295 In an opinion just 
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three sentences long, he wrote that he believed the Club had standing 
based on the second reason articulated by Blackmun.296 
Even after putting the finishing touches on his passionate dissent, 
Harry Blackmun remained disturbed by the case. Early on the morning 
of April 19, the day the Court’s decision was to be announced, he 
dispatched a clerk to Douglas’s chamber, stating, “Mr. Justice 
Blackmun desires to deliver his dissent orally from the bench, but . . . 
he will not do so unless you also deliver your dissent orally. He 
therefore requests that you dissent orally today.”297 Douglas agreed, 
and they both read their dissents in open court.298 
All flowery rhetoric aside, Douglas’s dissent suggested that 
environmental organizations should have standing to sue when a 
“natural object” suffers an injury in fact; Blackmun’s dissent suggested 
that anyone with a “provable, sincere, dedicated and established 
status” as interested in the environment should have standing to 
“litigate environmental issues.”299 Neither opinion was truly radical. 
Douglas’s opinion embraced the injury in fact requirement that he had 
first written into law in Data Processing.300 Even Blackmun’s opinion 
did not elaborate at length on just what he meant by “litigate 
environmental issues,” and it is worth noting that Blackmun framed 
his opinion as “no more progressive than was the decision in Data 
Processing itself.”301 
None of the dissenting Justices unequivocally stated that the Sierra 
Club could have had standing in the absence of an injury. None 
mentioned the old doctrine of standing for the public.302 Blackmun 
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came the closest, but it appears he may not have even grasped the 
possibility or the history of the Court’s approach to standing. 
Rather, Blackmun’s truly innovative language came toward the end 
of his brief dissent. There, he discussed the changes that Disney’s 
development of Mineral King would bring and asked, “Do we need 
any further indication and proof that all this means that the area will 
no longer be one ‘of great natural beauty’ and one ‘uncluttered by the 
products of civilization?’ Are we to be rendered helpless to consider 
and evaluate allegations and challenges of this kind because of 
procedural limitations rooted in traditional concepts of standing? I 
suspect that this may be the result of today’s holding.”303 To 
Blackmun, what was different about Sierra Club, compared to most 
other standing cases, was that it was an environmental case. The 
dangers presented by the “world’s deteriorating environment” and the 
“resulting ecological disturbances”304 were so great that it justified 
casting aside the “procedural limitations rooted in traditional concepts 
of standing.” 
Blackmun underscored this belief in the uniqueness of 
environmental cases, and the necessity of allowing standing in them, 
by concluding his dissent with a quotation from John Donne:  
“No man is an Iland, intire of itselfe; every man is a peece 
of the Continent, a part of the maine; if a Clod bee washed 
away by the Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if a 
Promontorie were, as well as if a Mannor of thy friends or 
of thine owne were; any man’s death diminishes me, because 
I am involved in Mankinde; And therefore never send to 
know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee.”305  
In other words, we are all affected by environmental degradation; no 
one is an island, immune from such destruction. 
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D. The Aftermath 
In the weeks after the Court announced its decision in Sierra Club 
v. Morton, Douglas was inundated with correspondence, praising his 
eloquence.306 “To me, as obviously to you,” one man from California 
wrote on April 23, 1972, “the central question is not the technical 
interpretation of who has or has not ‘standing’ before the Supreme 
Court but the basic welfare of each human being in relation to his 
increasingly despoiled surrounding.”307 Blackmun received fewer 
notes of praise.308 Meanwhile, back in California, the Sierra Club did 
just as the Court recommended and amended its complaint to assert 
standing based on the injury suffered by Club members who hiked and 
camped in Mineral King.309 As the case dragged on through the 1970s, 
the state of California withdrew its support and in 1978 Congress 
added Mineral King to Sequoia National Park, officially protecting it 
from development.310 
Sierra Club’s effect on the doctrine of standing was immediate and 
significant. Within weeks, lower courts across the country began citing 
it.311 Legal philosophers ran with Douglas’s dissent and began 
debating legal rights for nature.312 And the Court continued to hear 
standing cases, giving the Justices the opportunity to refine the 
doctrine even further—especially Lewis Powell, who joined the Court 
just after Sierra Club was decided and who worried about the dangers 
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of liberalizing standing.313 In 1973, Marshall wrote an opinion 
introducing the requirements that, in order to have standing, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct had directly caused his 
injury and that the court had the ability to redress that injury (later, two 
central components of the Lujan test).314 In 1975, Powell wrote for the 
Court that standing must be based on one’s own “distinct and palpable” 
injury, not that of any third party; Powell’s opinion also affirmed 
Marshall’s demands of causation and redressability, introduced two 
years earlier.315 In 1976, Powell wrote another standing opinion, this 
one clarifying that, even when Congress created a specific statutory 
right of action, “the requirements of Article III remain”—including an 
injury in fact.316 Elizabeth Magill has argued that when the Court 
handed down this decision, it “erased the standing for the public 
principle.”317 Justice Brennan wrote separately, calling the apparent 
elimination of standing for the public “most disturbing.”318 
Meanwhile, the Court did repeatedly affirm that environmental and 
aesthetic injuries did count as injuries in fact, so long as they could be 
directly traced to the defendant’s activity.319 
In 1983, a rising star judge named Antonin Scalia wrote an 
influential article entitled, “The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential 
Element of the Separation of Powers.” In it, he called standing a 
“crucial and inseparable element” of the principle of separation of 
powers, “whose disregard will inevitably produce—as it has during the 
past few decades—an overjudicialization of the process of self-
governance.”320 Scalia boldly suggested “that courts need to accord 
greater weight than they have in recent times to the traditional 
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requirement that the plaintiff’s alleged injury be a particularized one, 
which sets him apart from the citizenry at large.”321 Scalia’s 
“traditional requirement” was a blatant misrepresentation of history, 
but it was nonetheless a harbinger of what was to come. Scalia feared 
that broad standing gave the judiciary too much power and thus 
threatened the separation of powers. Scalia also specifically mocked 
standing for environmental plaintiffs: “ensuring strict environmental 
laws . . . met with approval in the classrooms of Cambridge and New 
Haven, but not in the factories of Detroit and the mines of West 
Virginia.”322 
In 1992, now ensconced on the Supreme Court, Scalia got the 
chance to realize his dream. That year, the Court decided Lujan v. 
Defenders of Wildlife, a case in which an environmental nonprofit sued 
the government to challenge the validity of federal action. The 
Endangered Species Act held that federal agencies had to consult the 
Secretary of the Interior or Commerce before carrying out actions that 
are likely to threaten “the continued existence of any endangered 
species.”323 Originally, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National 
Marine Fisheries Service promulgated a joint resolution stating that 
this extended to actions taken in foreign nations; when, after the two 
agencies revised this regulation in 1986, requiring consultation only 
for domestic actions, Defenders of Wildlife sued. Members of the 
group had visited foreign places where endangered species were found 
and feared for their survival.324 Scalia, writing for a divided court, held 
that the Defenders did not have standing. The Defenders had failed to 
show that the threats to endangered species caused it an injury in fact, 
or that the court could redress its alleged injuries.325 
Scalia articulated a three-part test for standing, which he claimed 
“[o]ver the years, our cases have established.”326 First, “the plaintiff 
must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact’—an invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) 
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actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.”327 This injury 
“must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.”328 Second, 
“there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct 
complained of—the injury has to be “fairly traceable” to the 
challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the 
independent action of some third party not before the court.”329 
Finally, “it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the 
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.”330 
Yet Scalia’s opinion went even further than establishing this test. 
For the first time,331 the Court held that Article III required invalidation 
of an explicit congressional grant of standing. The Court struck down 
the Endangered Species Act’s grant of a right of action to any person 
suing to stop a violation of the Act.332 “We have consistently held,” 
wrote Scalia, “that a plaintiff raising only a generally available 
grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every 
citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, 
and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than 
it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or 
controversy.”333 This was based on Scalia’s concern about separation 
of powers: “To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public 
interest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an 
‘individual right’ vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to 
transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most 
important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.’”334 
This flagrantly disregarded and misstated history. It completely 
ignored centuries of standing for the public. It reflected a view of 
standing that was, in the words of Cass Sunstein, “surprisingly 
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novel.”335 Sunstein, for one, was clear about how he felt about this 
ahistorical innovation: “It has no support in the text or history of 
Article III. It is essentially an invention of federal judges, and recent 
ones at that. Certainly it should not be accepted by judges who are 
sincerely committed to the original understanding of the Constitution 
and to judicial restraint. Nor should it be accepted by judges who have 
different approaches to constitutional interpretation.”336 
Harry Blackmun, well over 80 and just two years from retirement, 
despaired at this desecration of his hopes from Sierra Club. He accused 
Scalia and the majority of going on a “slash-and-burn expedition 
through the law of environmental standing.”337 As Robert V. Percival 
has shown, Scalia’s draft opinion in Lujan had been slow to win 
acceptance. Souter and Kennedy convinced Scalia to make small 
changes in order to get their votes, much to Scalia’s annoyance. 
Blackmun’s clerks also believed Scalia had revised his majority 
opinion in response to pointed criticisms in Blackmun’s draft 
dissent.338 Blackmun’s final dissent angrily denounced Scalia’s 
opinion as departing from and mischaracterizing precedent.339 He 
rejected the majority’s invalidation of the Endangered Species Act’s 
conferral of standing, but he did not invoke the long history of standing 
for the public.340 
Blackmun viewed this case, at its core, as an attack on not just the 
law of standing, but on “the law of environmental standing” in 
particular.341 And he was not alone. One of the losing attorneys in 
Lujan later told the press that the Court was putting environmental 
attorneys “out of business.”342 
Yet it is a shame that Blackmun did not fight harder, or more 
specifically, for the old doctrine of statutorily created standing even in 
the absence of an injury. The invalidation of a statutory right of action 
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did indeed go against precedent.343 And it went against the wisdom and 
intentions of past Justices. As recently as 1970, for instance, William 
O. Douglas had written in a memo to his colleagues: “Congress in a 
regulatory statute could give standing explicitly to some and deny it to 
all others. Such a statute would not be unconstitutional as I understand 
it.”344 The Court has strayed far from that view, and the public and the 
environment are the worse because of that. 
E. Standing in Environmental Cases Today 
For the most part, Scalia’s three-part test from Lujan remains the 
law of the land when it comes to standing in environmental cases (and 
standing in general): a plaintiff must demonstrate that she has suffered 
(1) a concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent “injury in fact,” 
which is (2) “fairly traceable” to the defendant’s conduct, and (3) 
which can be redressed by a favorable court decision.345 The meaning 
of “injury-in-fact” is perhaps the most debated term in the 
environmental context, but the Court in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., clearly separated injury-to-the-plaintiff 
from injury-to-the-environment, demanding only the former be shown. 
To have suffered an injury-in-fact in the environmental context, a 
plaintiff must: (1) produce evidence that environmental harm, or 
“reasonable concerns” about the effects of environmental harm, 
“directly affected [the plaintiffs’] recreational, aesthetic, and economic 
interests”; (2) this evidence must “present dispositively” more than 
mere “general averments” and “conclusory allegations” or “‘some 
day’ intentions”; (3) it must be “undisputed” that the defendant’s 
“unlawful conduct . . . was occurring at the time the complaint was 
filed”; and (4) there must be “nothing ‘improbable’ about the 
proposition” that such would cause the plaintiffs harm.346 
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Plaintiffs can still assert that the injury-in-fact that they’ve suffered 
is non-physical and non-economic,347 but the hurdle is somewhat 
higher for asserting an injury-in-fact to one’s health.348 Courts have 
issued mixed messages on whether rising sea levels and other climate 
harms constitute actual, imminent, and traceable injuries-in-fact.349 
And the Supreme Court recently affirmed Scalia’s decidedly anti-
originalist move of striking down a statutory grant of standing on 
separation-of-powers grounds. “Congress’ role in identifying and 
elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically 
satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a 
person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to 
vindicate that right,” wrote Justice Alito.350 “Article III standing 
requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory 
violation.”351 
II. STANDING IN ENVIRONMENTAL CASES TOMORROW: A SEPARATE 
RULE OF STANDING FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CASES 
A. The Lessons of History 
So why does this this history matter? How is it relevant to us, today? 
A close look at the arguments and deliberations that led us to today’s 
standing regime reveals the sheer unlikeliness of it. For centuries, 
standing was no bar at all to a plaintiff with a cause of action; for 
decades into the twentieth century, congressional grants of standing 
were unquestionably constitutional and standing for the public 
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remained a viable option. A journey through the Justices’ papers 
discloses that, even as they wrote the seminal standing decisions of the 
1960s and 1970s, the Justices did not intend to abandon the twentieth 
century status quo. The “injury-in-fact” requirement is a modern one, 
an ahistorical one, and, apparently, a largely accidental creation. 
The Justices’ ignorance, and the inadvertent errors made by the 
Club’s attorneys, and by Douglas and Brennan in their earlier decisions 
(eliding mention of standing for the public), caused the death of the 
old doctrine. There is no smoking gun—no letter or memo indicating 
that the Justices were biased or bigoted in some way that should 
obviously be reversed. Rather, a close examination of the historical 
record inescapably leads one to the conclusion that several of the 
advocates and jurists involved knew not what they did—there is plenty 
of evidence that Douglas, Brennan, Harlan, and Blackmun never 
intended to abandon standing for the public.352 This is reason enough 
to reexamine what was, for centuries, the accepted doctrine. The 
Supreme Court has revisited its novel and ignorant precedents before, 
and it should do so in this context. 
Further, Blackmun’s tortured deliberations in Sierra Club reveal two 
crucial insights. First, plaintiffs should have standing to sue to protect 
the environment, even in the absence of an injury to themselves or their 
interests. Blackmun called this (ahistorically, but sincerely) “an 
imaginative expansion of our traditional concepts of standing.”353 And 
second, they should have this automatic standing because 
environmental cases are simply different. “The Nation’s and the 
world’s deteriorating environment with its resulting ecological 
disturbances,”354 in Blackmun’s words, represent the most pressing 
danger ever faced by humanity and human civilization. 
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In recent years, leaders from United Nations Secretary General 
António Guterres355 to President Barack Obama356 have reiterated that 
climate change, driven by anthropogenic pollution and environmental 
degradation, is the single greatest threat to future generations. In 2013, 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) released its 
Fifth Assessment, summing up the latest research on man-made 
climate change.357 The Fifth Assessment used stronger language than 
any previous report to connect human activity (primarily the burning 
of fossil fuels) to climate change—upgrading the connection from 
“very likely” to “extremely likely.”358 It emphasized the threat of 
“irreversible impacts,” including mass extinction events, increased 
risk of fires, pest, and disease outbreaks,359 immense deforestation, and 
huge numbers of climate refugees.360 “Science has spoken. There is no 
ambiguity,” declared then-United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-
moon, announcing the Fifth Assessment. “Leaders must act; time is not 
on our side.”361 
In October 2018, the IPCC released a special report titled, Global 
Warming of 1.5°C. Prepared by nearly 100 authors from 40 countries, 
and synthesizing thousands of scientific studies, the new report 
concluded that catastrophic drought, flooding, heat, and cold were 
likely as soon as 2040—far sooner than previously forecasted—all as 
a result of rising global temperatures; this, in turn, would expose 
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hundreds of millions of people to poverty, displacement, and death.362 
Limiting global warming to merely 1.5°C (which would still wreak 
global havoc, though far less than, say, 2°C) would require a 
transformation of the world economy at a scale that has “no 
documented historic precedent.”363 Climate policy scholar Nathan 
Hultman wryly commented, “An equally accurate but more evocative 
title could have been, ‘We’re almost out of time.’”364 To say that 
environmental cases are simply different is not to diminish the great 
importance of other issues. It is simply to say that no other potential 
problem poses as serious and imminent a threat to the survival of 
human civilization as we know it, and to humanity itself, as climate 
change. 
Unfortunately, the modern standing doctrine is remarkably poorly 
suited for species-wide and far-away injuries.365 “Projections of future 
climate change are not like weather forecasts. It is not possible to make 
deterministic, definitive predictions of how climate will evolve over 
the next century and beyond as it is with short-term weather forecasts,” 
wrote the IPCC.366 Furthermore, environmental damage is 
cumulative—it builds on other damage, interacts with it, and combines 
in ways that have far-reaching effects we cannot fully understand. 
Therefore, even apparently small-scale and localized pollution 
contributes to global devastation. This is difficult—perhaps 
impossible—to reconcile with the modern standing doctrine’s demand 
for a concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent “injury in 
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fact.”367 It is particularly difficult given the 1983 case of City of Los 
Angeles v. Lyons, in which the Court wrote, “Abstract injury is not 
enough . . . . [T]he injury or threat of injury must be both real and 
immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.”368 
It is useless to strain and stretch to fit the harms caused by climate 
change into the Court’s Lujan-based view of standing. That test simply 
is not designed to consider injuries of this scope or kind—injuries that 
have billions of contributors, that affect billions in difficult-to-discern 
ways, and that will affect billions in ways that we can only speculate 
about. The only way for climate plaintiffs to consistently obtain 
standing is to throw the Lujan framework out entirely. 
B. The Remedy 
The Supreme Court’s environmental standing doctrine is uniquely, 
punitively restrictive in an ahistorical and illogical way. Because of 
this, the Court should overturn Lujan and alter earlier precedents to 
return to a standing regime that accepts legislative grants of standing 
and allows plaintiffs to stand for the public—at least in environmental 
matters. However, given the current makeup of the Court, it would be 
folly to bring a case to this effect to Washington. Until a more 
favorable collection of Justices is seated, it would be best to turn to 
state-level reforms. Since the purported requirements of Article III 
only apply in federal court, states can provide favorable venues for 
reform to environmental standing. Examples of attempted reforms 
from the past half-century indicate that progress is certainly possible, 
but that drafters of statutes or amendments to this effect must be 
exceptionally careful with their language. 
The story of modern state statutes to broaden environmental 
standing begins in 1970, when Michigan passed the Michigan 
Environmental Policy Act (MEPA).369 MEPA allowed the state 
attorney general “or any person” to bring suit “for declaratory and 
equitable relief against any person for the protection of the air, water, 
and other natural resources and the public trust in these resources from 
pollution, impairment, or destruction.”370 Notably, the law did not 
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define pollution, environmental quality, or the public trust—it was 
meant to be “flexible, innovative, and responsive.”371 
MEPA was the brainchild of Joseph Sax, a young law professor at 
the University of Michigan who had spent the 1960s considering 
creative ways of increasing citizen participation in promoting 
environmental quality372 and was influenced by the environmental 
movement that was exploding during that turbulent decade.373 In the 
late 1960s, Sax was approached by the West Michigan Environmental 
Action Council, which gave him $1,000 to develop legislation that 
would “give the citizen much greater rights to a livable 
environment.”374 Sax decided to draft a bill that would recognize a 
public right to a decent environment and make that right enforceable 
by the public.375 He felt about environmental standing the same way 
Blackmun had: it was simply different. “[T]he Mineral King decision 
suggests that environmental controversies are really nothing more than 
struggles between developers and birdwatchers,” he would write after 
the Court decided Sierra Club.376 
The Court majority seems oblivious to the central message 
of the current environmental literature—that the issues to 
engage our serious attention are risks of long-term, large 
scale, practically irreversible disruptions of ecosystems. By 
denying to persons who wish to assert those issues the right 
to come into court, and granting standing only to one who 
has a stake in his own present use and enjoyment, the Court 
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reveals how little it appreciated the real meaning of the test 
case it had before it.377 
Over three-and-a-half days in 1969, Sax drafted the bill and sent it 
to the Action Council. “It discourages me to think that we can only be 
protected by having the right to sue,” an Action Council member wrote 
in response, “yet I agree that there doesn’t seem to be any other way. 
The fact that we might have that right then becomes terribly exciting 
and important!”378 State Representative Thomas Anderson introduced 
H.B. 3055 on April 1, 1969; over the next several months, the state 
legislature debated whether the judiciary could properly perform the 
duties the bill was entrusting to it.379 Though legislators and citizens 
expressed fears that the law could flood the state courts with nuisance 
suits, the law passed in July 1970 and was signed by the governor 
shortly thereafter.380 
In the first 13 years after MEPA’s passage, 185 actions were filed 
under the law (coming from more than half of Michigan’s 83 
counties).381 Contrary to the predictions of many critics of looser 
standing, these actions resulted in considerable success.382 As one 
observer noted years later:  
“Citizens used MEPA to produce such public interest 
victories as halting Shell Oil’s plan to indiscriminately drill 
for oil and natural gas in the Pigeon River Country State 
Forest in the late 1970s. Other MEPA-based victories 
include blocking Mason County from dredging damaging 
new channels in a river in 1975, and forcing developers to 
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comply with environmental standards in building 
condominiums along Lake Michigan in Manistee in the late 
1990s.”383  
Courts found that MEPA applied quite broadly, allowing for citizen 
actions in the areas of “toxic substances control, sand dune mining, 
wetlands protection, park management and leasing of Great Lakes 
bottomlands.”384 And, as one scholar of the law wrote in 1985, 
“statistics indicate that frivolous neighborhood disputes have not 
flooded the Michigan court system.”385 Suits filed under MEPA in its 
first five years constituted less than 0.02 percent of all civil suits 
filed.386 
Sax was deeply distressed by the Court’s ruling in Sierra Club.387 
He wanted other states to copy MEPA, and in 1971 he published an 
influential book that included a “model law” as an appendix.388 Over 
the next decade, eight states adopted statutes closely modeled on 
MEPA: Connecticut,389 Florida,390 Maryland,391 Minnesota,392 
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Nevada,393 New Jersey,394 North Dakota,395 and South Dakota396 
(while two states—Hawaii397 and Illinois398—amended their 
constitutions to the same effect).399 In 1970, bills modeled after MEPA 
were also introduced in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, 
but neither passed.400 Two additional states, Indiana401 and Iowa,402 
passed similar laws in subsequent decades, while two other states, 
Louisiana403 and Wyoming,404 passed laws in the 1970s granting 
standing to protect the environment, but only (in the words of both 
statutes) to “any person having an interest, which is or may be 
adversely affected.”405 
As Susan George summarized in 1997, these fourteen states, as well 
as Michigan, all “solidif[ied] the standing of citizens to sue for 
environmental regulations,” but the laws and amendments differed in 
the kind of relief they offered (injunctive, declaratory, monetary) and 
whether they forced the state to act.406 Only half of these provisions 
enabled a citizen suit in the absence of a violation of the law, which is 
a “powerful tool.”407 Thus, standing alone is not enough. An ideal 
statute enabling a citizen to stand for the public to protect the 
environment would enable all kinds of relief, force the state to act, and 
enable citizens to sue even in the absence of a violation of the law. 
Further, standing alone is sometimes not even sufficient. After 
decades of successful use (without an onslaught of nuisance suits), 
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Michigan courts begin ruling that the “any person” provision of MEPA 
violated the separation of powers enshrined in Michigan’s 
constitution.408 “When a broadening and redefinition of the ‘judicial 
power’ comes not from the judiciary itself, usurping a power that does 
not belong to it, but from the Legislature purporting to confer new 
powers upon the judiciary, the exercise of such power is no less 
improper,” wrote the court in a 4-3 decision in 2004.409 Further, the 
“judicial power,” as the justices understood it, demanded a “plaintiff 
who has suffered real harm . . . . Absent a ‘particularized’ injury, there 
would be little that would stand in the way of the judicial branch 
becoming intertwined in every matter of public debate.”410 The next 
year, the Michigan Court of Appeals relied on the 2004 case, as well 
as Lujan, to deny standing to citizen and organizational plaintiffs 
because they could not show that they used the particular areas to be 
affected by pollution, and thus “they cannot demonstrate that they have 
suffered or would suffer a concrete and particularized injury distinct 
from that of the public generally.”411 In 2010, however, the Michigan 
Supreme Court repudiated its own latter-day restriction of standing, 
explicitly rejecting the “Lujan test” for standing in federal court and 
instead “restored . . . a limited, prudential doctrine that is consistent 
with Michigan’s long-standing historical approach to standing. Under 
this approach, a litigant has standing whenever there is a legal cause 
of action.”412 The 2010 decision was not in the MEPA context, and 
though it appears to encompass MEPA actions, certain members of the 
Michigan Supreme Court have expressed a desire to return to the more 
restrictive Lujan text.413 
Courts in other states have retained broad standing, even in the 
absence of an injury. Minnesota courts, for instance, continue to 
recognize standing for “any person” and citizens have used the 
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Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA) for decades with 
considerable success.414 One commentator writes that this is because 
of MERA’s “exhaustive list of definitions, including a definition of the 
term ‘person,’” which has “provided critical guidance to the Minnesota 
courts . . . .”415 Thus, the specific language in the law matters a great 
deal. As another example, consider the Maryland Environmental 
Standing Act (MESA). “The General Assembly of Maryland, in 
promulgating MESA, aspired to relieve Maryland citizens of the 
hardships associated with overly-strict environmental standing,” wrote 
Daniel W. Ingersoll IV.416 The legislature drafted MESA specifically 
to give standing to people who had not suffered an injury.417 
“However, the poor drafting and contradictory language of the Act 
prevent Marylanders from enjoying the same rights as the states listed 
above [i.e. Minnesota, South Dakota, etc.] because they have no right 
to judicial review of alleged violations of the Act.”418 Apparently 
because of sloppiness, “MESA’s broad standing requirements apply to 
an incredibly limited field of remedies that does not include judicial 
review of an agency action.”419 
Sadly, MERA too has been undermined. Because Minnesota courts 
have not interpreted MERA to grant attorneys’ fees to successful 
plaintiffs,420 “the statute effectively provides standing only to those 
with considerable financial resources, or for those who use it as a 
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shield of last-resort.”421 The same is true of MEPA.422 Indeed, 
according to George, only half of the state statutes provide for the 
award of fees and costs.423 An ideal statute, then, would define as many 
terms as possible, as comprehensively as possible, and would allow for 
the granting of attorneys and litigation fees. 
Administrative procedures can also present roadblocks. Indiana’s 
Environmental Policy Act, for instance, forces plaintiffs to exhaust all 
administrative remedies, and allow the state agency to hold a hearing 
and make a determination (which it has 180 days to do) before they 
can sue.424 “These barriers to suit have prevented the Indiana act from 
being used very frequently,” writes Peter H. Lehner.425 Similarly 
onerous administrative requirements also hinder citizen actions 
enabled by Florida’s Environmental Protection Act.426 Thus, an ideal 
law would not make a plaintiff jump through these hoops. 
Even when the guarantee of standing was part of the state 
constitution, judges could still find loopholes. Article XI, section 2 of 
the Illinois constitution allowed any person to sue “any party, 
governmental or private” to enforce their “right to a healthful 
environment.”427 However, in 2012, the state supreme court held that 
while this section “does away with the ‘special injury’ requirement 
typically employed in environmental nuisance cases,” it “does not 
create any new causes of action . . . . Therefore, although [a] plaintiff 
need not allege a special injury to bring its environmental claim, there 
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(Fla. 1980). 
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must nevertheless still exist a cognizable cause of action.”428 Thus, a 
group of citizens did not have standing to sue a coal company and state 
agency because its permits were not in compliance with state law, as 
they had no statutory or common law cause of action.429 Furthermore, 
the state supreme court ruled that a plaintiff did not have standing 
under this section to bring a private cause of action for violation of the 
Endangered Species Protection Act, because the section’s right to a 
“healthful environment” was not intended to include the protection of 
endangered species.430 
Hawaii’s constitution’s Article XI, section 9, approved by voters in 
1978,431 was somewhat more specific than Illinois’s, but, crucially, it 
did not specify that environmental plaintiffs could sue in the absence 
of an injury. Section 9 states: 
Each person has the right to a clean and healthful 
environment, as defined by laws relating to environmental 
quality, including control of pollution and conservation, 
protection and enhancement of natural resources. Any 
person may enforce this right against any party, public or 
private, through appropriate legal proceedings, subject to 
reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law.432 
Hawaiian courts have ruled that, because section 9 is part of the 
constitution, it allows for a “less rigorous standing requirement,”433 
and “where the interests at stake are in the realm of environmental 
concerns, we have not been inclined to foreclose challenges to 
administrative determinations through restrictive applications of 
standing requirements.”434 However, Hawaiian courts have also stated 
that this less rigorous, less restrictive analysis still demands that 
                                                                 
 428. Citizens Opposing Pollution v. ExxonMobil Coal U.S.A., 962 N.E.2d 956, 
967 (Ill. 2012). 
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 430. Glisson v. City of Marion, 720 N.E.3d 1034, 1045 (Ill. 1999). 
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 433. Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 292, 313 (Haw. 2007). 
 434. In re Maui Elec. Co., 408 P.3d 1, 22 (Haw. 2017) (citations and punctuation 
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plaintiffs show an injury-in-fact, “although there will be no 
requirement that their asserted injury be particular to the plaintiffs, and 
the court will recognize harms to plaintiffs environmental interests 
[sic] as injuries that may provide the basis for standing.”435 The court 
defined this injury as a harm to “some legally protected interest,” 436 
and under section 9 individuals do have an interest in “a clean and 
healthful environment,”437 which is fairly generous, as far as injury-in-
fact tests go. However, plaintiffs still must go through a three-part 
analysis based on Lujan: “a plaintiff must have suffered an actual or 
threatened injury; the injury must be fairly traceable to the defendant’s 
actions; and a favorable decision would likely provide relief for the 
plaintiff’s injury.”438 
In sum, a brief overview of the statutes attempting to broaden 
environmental standing for citizens indicates that, for these statutes to 
succeed, specificity and comprehensiveness are key. Provisions for 
litigation fees, elimination of administrative roadblocks, and the 
articulation of comprehensive definitions must all be considered. State 
constitutional amendments would be ideal, for then courts could not 
get in the way by invoking Scalia-esque separation of powers 
concerns, but such an ideal amendment would have to specify that 
citizens can bring actions in the absence of an injury, in the absence of 
a violation of the law, and it would articulate several specific causes 
of action. 
CONCLUSION 
My hope is that this Article has demonstrated the urgent necessity 
of fundamentally reforming the American environmental standing 
doctrine. In the following, I propose a model law to accomplish this; it 
builds upon the wisdom of other such laws, and assessments of these 
laws by scholars. I have borrowed liberally, and often verbatim, from 
the language of several of these laws.439 Ideally, this would be enacted 
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as a state constitutional amendment. And certainly, I hope others 
interested in such a model law would improve it. This, then, should be 
thought of as a modest attempt at constructing a mere foundation. 
MODEL ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND STANDING ACT 
Purpose: 
AN ACT to provide for actions for declaratory relief, mandamus 
relief, equitable relief (including injunctive relief and specific 
performance), civil penalties, and restoration damages, for the 
protection of the environment. The legislature finds and declares that 
each person, and future generations, is entitled by right to the 
protection, preservation, and enhancement of air, water, land, flora, 
fauna, and all other natural resources located within the state. The 
legislature further declares its policy to create and maintain within the 
state conditions under which human beings, non-human animals, and 
nature can exist in harmony, in order that present and future 
generations of humans and non-human animals may enjoy clean air 
and water, productive and healthy land, and other natural resources 
with which this state has been endowed. Accordingly, it is in the public 
interest to provide an adequate civil remedy to protect air, water, land, 
flora, fauna, and other natural resources located within the state from 
pollution, impairment, or destruction. 
Definitions: 
For the purposes of this Act, the following terms have the meanings 
given them in this section. 
Person: “Person” means any natural person, any state, municipality 
or other governmental or political subdivision or other public agency 
or instrumentality, any public corporation, any not-for-profit 
partnership, firm, association, or other not-for-profit organization, any 
receiver, trustee, assignee, agent, or other legal representative of any 
of the foregoing. “Person” does not mean any for-profit corporation, 
partnership, firm, association, organization, or entity. 
Environment: “Environment” shall include, but not be limited to, all 
natural resources, all flora and fauna, and all natural and artificial 
habitats thereof, within the state. 
Natural resources: “Natural resources” shall include, but not be 
limited to, all mineral, animal, botanical, air, water, land, timber, soil, 
quietude, recreational, and historical resources. Scenic and aesthetic 
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resources shall also be considered natural resources when owned or 
officially protected by any governmental unit or agency. 
Pollution, impairment, or destruction: “Pollution, impairment, or 
destruction” is any conduct by any person which violates, or is likely 
to violate, any environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, order, 
license, stipulation agreement, or permit of the state or any 
instrumentality, agency, or political subdivision thereof that was 
issued prior to the date the alleged violation occurred or is likely to 
occur; or any conduct—whether or not it is in violation of any law, 
regulation, rule, or order—which materially adversely affects or is 
likely to materially adversely affect the environment. 
State agency: “State agency” is any state agency, board, 
commission, council, officer, office, department, or division. 
Standing: 
The following persons have standing to bring and maintain an action 
provided for in this section in the courts of equity of this State: 
(1) The State of _____, or any agency or officer of the State, acting 
through the Attorney General; 
(2) Any political subdivision of the State of _____, or any agency 
or officer of it acting on its behalf; 
(3) Any other person, regardless of whether they possess a special 
interest different from that possessed generally by the residents of 
_____, or whether any personal or property damage to them is 
threatened, or whether they have suffered any injury whatsoever, or 
whether they are a citizen of _____ or of the United States. 
Civil Actions: 
Parties: Any person, the attorney general, any political subdivision 
of the estate, and any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a 
political subdivision thereof, may maintain a civil action in the district 
court for declaratory relief, mandamus relief, equitable relief 
(including injunctive relief and specific performance), civil penalties, 
or restoration damages, for the protection of the air, water, land, flora, 
fauna, or other natural resources located within the state, whether 
publicly or privately owned, from pollution, impairment, or 
destruction. Any person, the attorney general, any political subdivision 
of the estate, and any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a 
political subdivision thereof, may maintain such action against any 
person, including state, municipal, and other government agencies, and 
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any partnership, public or private corporation, firm, association, 
organization, or other entity, whether it is for-profit or not-for-profit. 
Any person, the attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, 
and any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political 
subdivision thereof, may do so regardless of whether said defendant 
has violated any law, ordinance, regulation, rule, or order of this state, 
or of any municipality therein, or of the United States. This section 
does confer a right of action to challenge the issuance and receipt of a 
permit or license. 
Service: Within seven days after commencing such action, the 
plaintiff shall cause a copy of the summons and complaint to be served 
upon the defendant. Within 21 days after commencing such action, the 
plaintiff shall cause written notice thereof to be published in a legal 
newspaper in the county in which suit is commenced, specifying the 
names of the parties, the designation of the court in which the suit was 
commenced, the date of filing, the act or acts complained of, and the 
declaratory or equitable relief requested. The court may order such 
additional notice to interested persons as it may deem just and 
equitable. 
Other parties: In any action maintained under this section, the 
attorney general is not permitted to intervene on behalf of the 
defendants. The same is true of any political subdivision of the state, 
and any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political 
subdivision thereof. 
Venue: Any action maintained under this section may be brought in 
any county of the state. 
Subsequent actions: Where any action maintained under this section 
results in a judgment that a defendant has not violated an 
environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, order, license, 
stipulation agreement, or permit promulgated or issued by any political 
subdivision of the state, and any instrumentality or agency of the state 
or of a political subdivision thereof, the judgment shall not in any way 
estop the subdivision, instrumentality, or agency from relitigating any 
or all of the same issues with the same or other defendant unless in the 
prior action the subdivision, instrumentality, or agency was either 
initially or by intervention a party. Where the action results in a 
judgment that the defendant has violated an environmental quality 
standard, limitation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or 
permit promulgated or issued by any political subdivision of the state, 
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and any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political 
subdivision thereof, the judgment shall be res judicata in favor of the 
agency in any action the subdivision, instrumentality, or agency might 
bring against the same defendant. 
Burden of Proof: 
In any action maintained under this Act, where the subject of the 
action is conduct governed by any environmental quality standard, 
limitation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or permit 
promulgated or issued by the government, whenever the plaintiff shall 
have made a prima facie showing that the conduct of the defendant 
violates or is likely to violate said environmental quality standard, 
limitation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or permit, the 
defendant may rebut the prima facie showing by the submission of 
evidence to the contrary; provided, however, that where the 
environmental quality standards, limitations, rules, orders, licenses, 
stipulation agreements, or permits of two or more of the 
aforementioned agencies are inconsistent, the most stringent shall 
control. 
In any other action maintained under this Act, whenever the plaintiff 
shall have made a prima facie showing that the conduct of the 
defendant has, or is likely to cause the pollution, impairment, or 
destruction of the air, water, land, flora, fauna, or other natural 
resources located within the state, the defendant may rebut the prima 
facie showing by the submission of evidence to the contrary. The 
defendant may also show, by way of an affirmative defense, that there 
is no feasible and prudent alternative and the conduct at issue is 
consistent with and reasonably required for promotion of the public 
health, safety, and welfare in light of the state’s paramount concern for 
the protection of its air, water, land and other natural resources from 
pollution, impairment, or destruction. Economic considerations alone 
shall not constitute a defense hereunder. 
Relief: 
The court may grant declaratory relief, mandamus relief, temporary 
or permanent equitable relief (including injunctive relief and specific 
performance), civil penalties, or restoration damages, or may impose 
such conditions upon a defendant as are necessary or appropriate to 
protect the air, water, land, flora, fauna and other natural resources 
located within the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction. 
This is true for all defendants. When the court grants temporary 
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equitable relief, it shall not require the plaintiff to post a bond sufficient 
to indemnify the defendant for damages suffered because of the 
temporary relief if permanent relief is not granted. 
Litigation Fees: 
The court shall award the full costs of litigation, including but not 
limited to reasonable witness and attorney’s fees, to a prevailing 
plaintiff in any action brought pursuant to this Act. The court may also 
award actual damages to the prevailing plaintiff. 
Litigation Fees Fund: 
The state shall establish a fund to award costs of litigation, including 
but not limited to reasonable witness and attorney’s fees, to a losing 
plaintiff in an action brought pursuant to this Act. A court may award 
costs of litigation to a losing plaintiff from this fund if the court 
determines that this would be in the service of justice, and if such 
action was brought in good faith. 
Intervention: Except as otherwise provided in this Act, in any 
administrative, licensing, or other similar proceeding, and in any 
action for judicial review thereof, and in any civil legal proceeding, 
any person, the attorney general, any political subdivision of the state, 
and any instrumentality or agency of the state or of a political 
subdivision thereof, shall be permitted to intervene as a party upon the 
filing of a verified pleading asserting that the proceeding or action for 
judicial review involves conduct that has caused or is likely to cause 
pollution, impairment, or destruction of the air, water, land or other 
natural resources located within the state. 
Grounds: In any such administrative, legal, licensing, or other 
similar proceedings, the agency shall consider the alleged impairment, 
pollution, or destruction of the air, water, land, or other natural 
resources located within the state and no conduct shall be authorized 
or approved which does, or is likely to have such effect so long as there 
is a feasible and prudent alternative consistent with the reasonable 
requirements of the public health, safety, and welfare and the state’s 
paramount concern for the protection of its air, water, land, and other 
natural resources from pollution, impairment, or destruction. 
Economic considerations alone shall not justify such conduct. 
Judicial review: In any action for judicial review of any 
administrative, licensing, or other similar proceeding as described in 
this section, the court shall, in addition to any other duties imposed 
upon it by law, grant review of claims that the conduct caused, or is 
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likely to cause pollution, impairment, or destruction of the air, water, 
land, or other natural resources located within the state, and in granting 
such review it shall act in accordance with the provisions of the state 
Administrative Procedure Act. 
Long-Arm Statute: 
Personal jurisdiction: As to any cause of action arising under this 
Act, the district court may exercise personal jurisdiction over any 
foreign corporation or any nonresident individual in the same manner 
as if it were a domestic corporation or the individual were a resident 
of this state. This section applies if, in person or through an agent, the 
foreign corporation or nonresident individual: 
(a) Commits or threatens to commit any act in the state which would 
impair, pollute or destroy the air, water, land, flora, fauna or other 
natural resources located within the state, or 
(b) Commits or threatens to commit any act outside the state which 
would impair, pollute or destroy the air, water, land, flora, fauna or 
other natural resources located within the state, or 
(c) Engages in any other of the activities specified in this Act. 
Service of process: The service of process on any person who is 
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, as provided in this 
section, may be made by personally serving the summons upon the 
defendant outside this state with the same effect as though the 
summons had been personally served within this state. 
Other ways to serve unaffected: Nothing contained in this section 
shall limit or affect the right to serve any process in any other manner 
now or hereafter provided by law or the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
This Act shall be supplementary to existing administrative and 
regulatory procedures provided by law. This Act is ordered to take 
immediate effect. 
